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THE COLLEGIATE SILENT MAJORITY: SOCIAL
CLASS, RELIGION, AND POLITICS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
"Silent Majority" is a term which came into political usage in 
1968. President Richard M. Nixon has used this term seemingly to des­
cribe those citizens who do not protest or demonstrate, who seldom 
make themselves heard with respect to the workings of the political 
system, and who therefore tend, perhaps, to be overlooked in the pres­
sures that play upon the government. There is the implication, too, 
that this silent majority consists of those who are in the middle; 
that is, those who are neither poor nor rich. By and large, then, 
they would be persons who are members of either the lower middle class 
or the working class —  the "solid citizens" or "middle Americans."
(Mr. Nixon has also used the term "forgotten Americans," but as syndi­
cated columnist Tom Wicker and others have indicated, such people are 
not forgotten —  particularly in an election year.)
The present study does not aim at the opinions of this group 
directly. Rather, it aims to explore in some depth the attitudes of a 
set of students attending three Oklahoma colleges widely recognized as 
tending to draw from the less well off families in the state.
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CBS, Fortune, Newsweek, Jeffrey Hadden, and Playboy have all 
polled college students fairly recently.^ As far as has been deter­
mined, however, no one has attempted to tap the beliefs and attitudes, 
and the factors that influence such attitudes, among college students 
drawn from families of the "silent majority." The previously men­
tioned Fortune survey did include interviews with students from blue 
collar families, but no extensive analysis was involved.
The members of this group are important for reasons that go 
beyond their comparative neglect. For one, because they are college 
students they should be among the more articulate members of the 
silent majority. For another, they and their opinions may be of con­
siderable importance in years to come. Additionally, intensive study 
of a selected population may reveal important interrelationships in 
attitudes. In short, it is important to know what these people think 
and how their attitudes —  political, social, religious, or whatever 
—  are related. Therefore, the general purpose of this dissertation 
is to examine the attitudes of college students who come predominantly 
from lower middle and working class backgrounds. Thus, the focal 
point is on the college-attending sons and daughters of what we may 
surmise to be the "silent majority" or "middle Americans" for whom 
President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew have often claimed to speak.
One initial question meriting attention concerns levels of 
political motivation, information, and activity. Many studies have
^CBS Poll, (April, 1969); Fortune (January and June, 1969); 
Newsweek (December 29, 1969); Jeffrey Hadden, "The Private Generation," 
Psychology Today (October, 1969); Playboy (September, 1970).
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shown that persons of higher social class are more interested in poli­
tics and more likely to be involved in political activities, while
those lower in the social strata are less interested and less likely
2to be active.
Other questions prompting this study concern the extent to which 
these collegiate "middle Americans" may be categorized as being liberal 
or conservative. In what sense may the terms "liberal" or "conserva­
tive" be used in this respect? That is, what are those students' atti­
tudes with regard to civil liberties, racial questions, the welfare 
state (economic liberalism or conservatism), and international affairs 
(specifically the Indochina War)? What percentage of them might be 
classified as authoritarians? How do all of these attitudes relate to 
a general knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of political affairs? And 
how do these attitudes interrelate? These questions are of obvious 
importance in trying to understand the presumed conservatism of the 
"silent majority."
A review of the literature suggests two underlying factors which 
affect these attitudes: religion and social class. The sociologist,
Gerhard Lenski, demonstrated a clear difference in the attitudes of
^Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, Human Behavior (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 422-424; Hugh Bone and Austin 
Raney, Politics and Voters (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1971), Chapters 1 
and 2; Angus Campbell et al. The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 
1964), Chapter 12, abridged edition; William Flanigan, Political Be­
havior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968); 
Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 
1963), Chapter 6; Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York, 
London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 48; Lester Mil- 
brath. Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), Chapter 5; 
Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 220-222.
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middle and working class respondents in Detroit.3 The present study 
showed a similar differentiation with respect to civil liberties, 
authoritarianism and attitude toward domestic Communism, but not with 
regard to racial attitudes. Thus, it may be surmised that "silent 
majority" opinions are somewhat divided and should not be thought of 
as monolithic. Another significant point made by Lenski was the find­
ing that religious liberalism (which he also calls doctrinal hetero­
doxy) "has little or no relationship to the types of political liberal­
ism" with which his study dealt.^ The phrase "types of political lib­
eralism" refers to attitudes toward the welfare state, racial issues, 
civil liberties, foreign affairs, and personal morality (especially 
legislation of morality). Another scholar who also has stressed the 
lack of a relationship between religious and political liberalism is 
Samuel Lubell.̂
Lenski observed that the only exception with regard to a link 
between political and religious liberalism was in the area of freedom 
of speech where he found what appeared to be a "modest relationship" 
between these two types of liberalism.® Clock and Stark, however, de­
monstrated that the less orthodox (or modernist) denominations such 
as the Congregational, Disciples of Christ, Episcopal, Methodist, and
Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, (Garden City: Doubleday 
Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4.
4lbid, p. 211.
^Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (Garden City: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), p. 122.
^Lenski, o£. cit., p. 211.
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Presbyterian were more predisposed in favor of civil liberties and 
against racism and anti-Semitism than were the fundamentalist reli­
gious organizations such as the Church of Christ, Nazarene, Southern 
Baptist, and Pentacostal groups.? Rokeach's observations that the 
"religiously devout are on the average more bigoted, more authoritar­
ian, more dogmatic, and more anti-humanitarian than the less devout" 
seemingly lend weight to Clock and Stark's findings.® Balswick's 
findings were like those of Rokeach and Clock and Stark. His study 
of clergymen revealed a strong relationship between theological 
liberalism and political liberalism in two areas: civil rights and 
civil liberties, and a less strong but definite relationship in the
Qareas of welfarism and internationalism.
In addition to these relationships it was deemed important to 
further explore Lenski's observation regarding the lack of relation­
ship between religious and political liberalism, especially because 
Balswick's findings contradict the contention that there is little or 
no relationship between the two types of liberalism with respect to 
civil liberties, civil rights, internationalism, and ideas about the 
welfare state.
^Charles Clock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti- 
Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Chapters 5,7 and 10.
®Milton Rokeach, "Faith, Hope and Bigotry," Psychology Today 
(April, 1970).
^Jack Balswick, "Theology and Political Attitudes Among the 
Clergy," The Sociological Quarterly, 11 (Summer, 1970), 397-405.
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Dean Peabody found that in his sample economic conservatism 
showed no correlation with authoritarianism, dogmatism, and anti- 
Semitism. This suggests that the fundamentalists discussed by 
Rokeach and Clock and Stark may not have been economic conservatives 
and that this religious belief and welfarism belief contrast merited 
further investigation. It is relationships such as these that are 
herein explored through a sample of the college attending offspring 
of the silent majority.
Located in the Greater Oklcihoma City Area, which has a total 
population of close to 650,000, the three colleges are Bethany Nazarene 
College, Central State University, and Oklahoma Christian College. 
Students attending these schools are overwhelmingly from Oklahoma and 
the majority are from the previously mentioned metropolitan area.
Bethany Nazarene College was founded in 1899 and has about 1500 
students. A Nazarene school, as its name indicates, the college is 
located in the city of Bethany (population about 23,000) which is in 
the western section of the Greater Oklahoma City Area. Both the town 
and school are generally thought of as having rather "conservative" 
and perhaps somewhat authoritarian views; long haired males, who drive 
through Bethany on U.S. Highway 66, have their cars stopped by local 
police with more than normal regularity. Additionally, a number of 
Bethany citizens are members of the John Birch Society, and the town
l^Dean Peabody, "Attitude Content and Agreement Set in Scales 
of Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, Anti-Semitism, and Economic Conserva­
tism," journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1961), 1-11.
7
itself is considered a Birch stronghold by those who regularly follow 
the activities of such groups.
Central State University was founded in 1890 and has a student 
population of over 10,000. Located in Edmond, a town of 16,500, 
which is bounded on the south, east, and west by Oklahoma City,
Central State is a part of the state college system and is the third 
largest institution of higher education in Oklahoma (behind the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma at. Norman and Oklahoma State University at Stillwater). 
The college is rightly known as a "commuter's school," having over 
three quarters of its students in that category. Offering many night 
courses. Central State has a large number of older, part-time students.
Affiliated with the Church of Christ, Oklahoma Christian College 
is located in the northern part of Oklahoma City, just south of Edmond. 
Since its founding in 1950, the college has grown to over one thousand 
students. It is generally considered to have a largely fundamentalist 
outlook, both politically and religiously. This outlook is reinforced 
by annual Freedom Forums at which speakers, who are typically either 
conservative or far right in their political philosophy, lecture the 
students on Communism, socialism, free enterprise, etc. A frequent 
speaker at these forums has been George Benson, former Chancellor of 
both Oklahoma Christian and Harding College in Searcy, Arkansas.
Dr. Benson has been a mainstay of the American radical right for many 
years.
This study proceeds in the following manner : Chapter Two con­
cerns methodology. Chapters Three, Four and Five explore the relation­
ship of social class to religious belief, civil liberties attitudes.
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racial attitudes, authoritarianism, domestic Communism, welfarism and 
level of political information. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight examine 
the relationship of religious belief to all of these factors, plus 
attitudes toward the Indochina War and demonstrations. Chapter Nine 
compares the three colleges in relation to the issue areas dealt with 
in the three chapters on social class.
Chapter Ten concentrates on party and presidential candidate 
preferences for 1968 and 1972, and relates them to attitudes of the 
respondents. For instance, does it hold true that Wallace supporters 
are more likely to be racists? Are Nixon supporters more or less 
authoritarian than Humphrey supporters? Which supporters are the most 
civil libertarian?, etc. Chapter Eleven consists of a summary and 
conclusions.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY AND BASIC SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The sites for sampling were selected because they are generally 
recognized as colleges which tend to attract persons from lower social 
strata than the two large state universities. Testing by means of a 
preliminary sample indicated that those attending were predominantly 
from lower middle and working class families. The final results of 
the sample revealed that 94% were from such backgrounds, with 38% from 
the lower middle class and 56% from the working class. To insure that 
the sample would be more nearly representative, the questionnaires 
were given in a course which is required of every Oklahoma college 
student, American National Government. Seventeen of such classes 
were available for sampling and ten of these were chosen at random.
All sampling was done in daytime classes.
The two church-affiliated colleges together have an enrollment 
of just over 2500 students; Oklahoma Christian has one thousand plus, 
while Bethany Nazarene has over fifteen hundred. Central State has in 
excess of 10,000 students. The number of usable questionnaires ob­
tained from each school was; Bethany Nazarene - 110, Central State - 
216, and Oklahoma Christian - 118. The total was 444. Attitude com­
parisons have been made not only with respect to religious categories 
and social classes, but also among the three colleges and among those
9
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respondents of differing political candidate preferences. A 
statistical test, the chi square, was utilized to check the signifi­
cance of findings. All significance tests in this study are of this 
type and are listed with the appropriate tables.
Before the questionnaires were passed out in each class, the 
following explanation was given verbally:
We appreciate your help with this study. It is 
related to important research at the University of 
Oklahoma. Let me emphasize that this will in no way 
effect the grade you receive in this course. You are 
not required to participate if you don't want to. We 
simply want to collect information and we feel that 
you will respond freely and honestly if we are unable 
to identify you personally, so please do not write 
your name on this questionnaire. Also, please answer 
the questions based on your own ideas and opinions 
and do not discuss them with your neighbors. With 
the exception of a few information questions there are 
no right or wrong answers. What is important is your 
opinion. If you have any questions please raise your 
hand.
The methods used to determine the respondents' social class and 
the particular religious categories in which they should be placed 
are discussed in the chapters dealing with these subjects.
Almost all of the questions which were utilized in gathering 
information were taken from previous studies. Foremost among these 
are investigations by Adorno, Comrey and Newmeyer, Free and Cantril, 
Clock and Stark, Lenski, McClosky, Schonbar, and Sheatsley.^ The
^Theodor W. Adorno, et The Authoritarian Personality (New 
York: Harper and Bros., 1950); A. Comrey and J. Newmeyer, "Measurement 
of Radicalism-Conservatism," Journal of Social Psychology, 67 (1965), 
357-369; Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Ameri­
cans (New York: Clarion Books, 1968); Chaurles Clock and Rodney Stark, 
Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) ; 
Cerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor 
Books, 1963); Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American
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appendix contains the questionnaire and notes sources from which ques­
tions were drawn.
Ninety-three percent of the respondents identified themselves 
"racially" as Caucasian, 3% as black, 2% as American Indiem, and 2% 
as "other." With regard to sex, the sample was exactly half male and 
half female. As to age, 81% fell into the category of 17-20, 14% were 
21-24, 3% were 25-28, and 2% were 29 and above. Sixty percent were 
freshmen, 26% sophmores, 10% juniors and 4% seniors. Thus, 86% were 
freshmen or sophomores and 95% fell into the age bracket of 17-24. 
Internal evidence from the survey confirmed that the students are 
overwhelmingly the offspring of parents who are either lower middle 
or working class.
Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361-382; 
Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, (New York: Basic Books, 1960); 
Rosalea A. Schonbar, "Students' Attitudes Toward Communists," Journal 
of Psychology, 27 (1949), 55-71; Paul Sheatsley, "White Attitudes 
Toward the Negrq!' Dhedalh's', 95 (1966), 217-238.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES : 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RACE
The effect of social class on political attitudes has been 
noted by numerous writers, including Berelson and Steiner, Bone and 
Raney, Campbell, Flanigan, Free and Cantril, Langton, Lenski, Lipset, 
and Milbrath.^ Virtually all of these and others who have written on 
the subject have made the observation that people of higher social 
class show greater interest and greater involvement in politics than 
do those of lower social class. Also noted has been the tendency of 
the working class to be more liberal in terms of economic policy or 
welfarism, while being less liberal with respect to racial attitudes 
and civil liberties than those higher in class.
It is the purpose of this chapter and the two following to exam­
ine the effects of social class in relation to religious beliefs, civil 
liberties, racial questions, authoritarianism, domestic Communism, and
Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, Human Behavior (New York; 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 422-424; Hugh Bone and Austin 
Raney, Politics and Voters (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1971), Chapter 2; 
Angus Campbell et al. The American Voter (New York; John Wiley, 1964) , 
Chapter 12, abridged edition; William Flanigan, Political Behavior of 
the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), Chapter 3; 
Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans 
(New York; Clêirion Books, 1968), Chapters 2 and 3; Kenneth Langton, 
Political Socialization (New York, London, Toronto; Oxford University 
Press, 1969), Chapters 4, 5 and 6; Gerhard Lenski, The Religious
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welfarism. The effect of social class on levels of political infor­
mation among these college attending offspring of the silent majority 
was also considered important enough for examination.
John Cuber's discussion of social class which in turn relies 
principally on the writings of Joseph Kahl, stresses the idea that 
the lower-middle class and the working class together comprise about 
80% of America's population with each class making up half this total.^ 
Roach, Gross, and Gursslin estimate the working class as being 30-40% 
and the total middle class as 40-50%.  ̂ Keeping in mind that the upper 
middle class comprises no more than 10% of the population, we may 
safely assume, then, that the two classes in question (lower-middle 
and working classes) comprise more or less three-quarters of the total 
United States population.
Utilizing Kahl's five class model we see the following brief 
profile of each class;
1. Upper Class - Fewer than one percent of families in the 
majority of communities fall into this category. Con­
taining mostly persons with a long family tradition, this
Factor (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4; Seymour 
M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), 
Chapters 4, 5 and 9; Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago : 
Rand McNally, 1965), Chapter 5.
2John Cuber, Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), Chapter 22; Joseph Kahl, The American 
Class Structure, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1957),
Chapter 7.
^Jack Roach, Llewellyn. Gross, and Orville Gursslin, social 
Stratification in the United States (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1969), Chapter 4.
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class also has a few newcomers who might be most 
accurately described as "self-made men." The 
main values of the upper class include "gracious 
living," the importance of family and reverence 
for the past.
Upper Middle Class - Less than ten percent of the 
families in most communities fall into this class. 
Family heads are typically independents in business 
and the professions, but also may be bureaucratic 
officials or persons who have risen in large corpor­
ations. Almost all of them are college graduates 
who generally pay very careful attention to their 
public behavior and are greatly concerned with their 
reputations. There is not much attention to family 
tradition in this class, but a strong career orien­
tation.
Lower Middle Class - Approximately forty percent of 
the families in most communities may be placed in 
this category. Typical occupations include foremen, 
skilled craftsmen, owners of small businesses, and 
clerks. Most persons in this class completed high 
school and some have attended college or received 
special technical training. These people attend 
church more regularly than those in any other social 
stratum. They have very strong "moral" attitudes 
(which in this context usually refers to sex, drugs.
15
and drinking) and appear to view themselves as solid 
citizens.
4. Working Class (also called upper lower class) - Com­
prising about forty percent of the families in most 
communities, this class is typified by blue collar 
workers. Their work is generally routine and "work 
life" and "home life" are, except in rare instances, 
completely separate.
5. Lower Class (also called the lower lower class) - Com­
prising about ten percent of the families in most 
communities, this class contains many people who work 
irregularly and who live in poverty. An unstable 
family life is quite common. Lower class persons do 
not have much hope of a better future.
According to August B. Hollingshead's method for determining 
social position (which we shall discuss shortly), the class structure 
of the sample taken at the three colleges turned out to be: no upper 
class, just under 5% upper middle class, 38% lower middle class, 56% 
working class, and under 2% lower class. Compared with Kahl's asser­
tions about the total United States population, such a distribution 
shows an under-representation of people from the upper, upper middle, 
and lower classes, a normal representation of lower middle class 
persons, plus an over-representation of working class persons. But 
an even larger discrepancy becomes apparent when the Oklahoma sample 
is compared to the United States college population only. With re­
ference to American colleges in 1960, Mayer and Buckley have shown
16
that although families with incomes above $10,000 per year comprised 
only 15% of the population, they furnished 29% of the people in col­
lege. Families with incomes ranging from $7,500 to $10,000 were 13% 
of the population, but supplied 21% of the college students. Conversely, 
the families with yearly incomes of $5,000 or less comprised 47% of the 
population, but supplied only 25% of the college population, while those 
whose income range was $5,000-$7,500 furnished 25% of both populations.^ 
These figures are not surprising, since, in addition to the financial 
problems involved in attending college, Hyman found strong evidence that 
the value of a college education is emphasized less in the lower social 
strata.5
Determination of social class has traditionally been approached in 
thre% ways : subjective, objective and reputational. The subjective ap­
proach consists simply of asking a person what class he belongs to. The 
reputational approach involves asking people about each other. The ob­
jective approach, however, involves consideration of several factors, 
including: income and property, education, occupation, family background, 
place of residence and time one has resided there, religious affiliation, 
and other affiliations (clubs, fraternal organizations, etc.). The 
method used to determine social class in the current study employs the 
objective approach and utilizes August B. Hollingshead's Two Factor 
Analysis of Social Position (privately mimeographed, 1957). The two 
factors used are education and occupation. Hollingshead devised an
^Kurt Mayer and Walter Buckley, Class and Society, (New York: 
Random House, 1970), p. 75.
^Herbert Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes," in Rein- 
hard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, Class, Status, and Power, (New York: 
The Free Press, 1966).
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Table III - 1
Social Class of Oklahoma Students and Total U.S. Population
Social Oklahoma Kahl's U.S.
Class Students Population
Upper 0% 1%
Upper Middle 5 9




♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Table III - 2 
Family Incomes in 1960^
U.S. U.S. College
Income Population Population
Above $10,000 15% 29%
$7,500-$10,000 13 21
$5,000-$7,500 25 25
Under $5,000 47 25
Total 100 100
’Mayer and Buckley, op. cit., p. 75.
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Occupational Scale, which lists almost every conceivable type of work, 
and has assigned numerical values of one through seven to various 
occupations. His categories include:
1. Higher Executives, Proprietors of Large Concerns, 
and Major Professionals
2. Business Managers, Proprietors of Medium-Sized 
Businesses, Lesser Professionals
3. Administrative Personnel, Small Independent Busi­
nesses, and Minor Professionals
4. Clerical and Sales Workers, Technicians, and 
Owners of Little Businesses (Value under $6,000)
5. Skilled Manual Employees
6. Machine Operators and Semi-Skilled Employees
7. Unskilled Employees
In assigning numerical values to levels of education, Hollings­
head 's Educational Scale reads as follows:
1. Graduate and Professional Training
2. Standard College or University Graduation
3. Partial College Training
4. High School Graduates
5. Partial High School
6. Junior High School
7. Less Than Seven Years of School
Once the Occupational and Educational Scale scores have been 
determined, a factor weight is assigned. The factor weight for occu­
pation is seven; that for education is three. Thus, if a respondent 
has an Occupational Scale score of three and an Educational Scale 
score of three, his social class would be determined thusly:
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Factor Scale Score Factor Weight Score x Weight
Occupation 3 7 21
Education 3 4 12
Index of Social Position Score 33
Since his score is 33, the respondent would fall into class III (which 
is called Lower Middle Class in the current study). Hollingshead in 
elaborating his scale explained that he "found the most meaningful 
breaks for the purpose of predicting the social class position of an 
individual" to be the following;






When (in the present study) the computed score for an individual 
turned out to be borderline, the mother's education and occupation 
were taken into consideration in finally determining the respondent's 
exact position.
A more recently devised method of determining class through the 
use of two factors is the "Index of Class Position" developed by Ellis, 
Lane, and Olesen.^ This method uses the father's occupation and the
^Robert A. Ellis, W. Clayton Lane, and Virginia Olesen, "The 
Index of Class Position: An Improved Intercommunity Measure of Strati­
fication, " toierican Sociologies Review, 28 (April, 1963), 271-75.
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student's class identification. While this technique was used with 
good results at Stanford University (and presumably at other univer­
sities), it was of dubious value in the present study. A considerable 
number of respondents had very little idea of their class position and 
tended to identify as members of a higher social class (although a few 
identified with a lower one) than that in which an objective determin­
ation placed them. For instance, a number of those whose fathers were 
blue collar workers with less than a highschool education, placed 
themselves in the upper middle class and one such respondent placed 
himself in the upper class. In fact, 41% of those who were objectively 
determined to be from working class families, considered themselves 
to be upper middle class and 36% considered themselves lower middle. 
Thus, better than three-quarters of the working class considered 
themselves to be middle class. In addition, almost two-thirds of the 
lower middle class respondents believed themselves to be upper middle
Table III - 3 
Social Class: Objective vs. Subjective







Middle Working Lower Total* (N)
Upper Middle 0% 90% 10% 0% 0% 100% (21)
Lower Middle 1 64 27 9 0 101 (168)
Working 1 41 36 23 0 101 (248)
Lower 0 0 57 43 0 100 (7)
♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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class. The preceeding table illustrates the futility of using the 
Index of Class Position (or any other measure in which the respondent 
is asked to classify himself) in this study. The question upon which 
the table was constructed was phrased in the following manner; Would 
you say that you belong to the: (1) Upper Class (2) Upper Middle 
Class (3) Lower Middle Class (4) Working Class (5) Lower Class.
The question may arise as to why a respondent's father's income 
was not used as a factor in the measure of social class. One problem 
of such a method is that the majority of students do not know their 
father's incomes. Second, mainy who do know are reluctant to give such 
information. Third, some people who make twenty or even thirty thou­
sand dollars per year never finished high school and have occupations 
which are not considered prestigeous. Thus, a knowledge of a respon­
dent's father's income would be of only limited value in this study.
Since fewer than two percent of the respondents were objectively 
determined to be fran lower class backgrounds, and since their atti­
tudes proved not to differ significantly from those of the working 
class respondents, the lower class has been combined with the working 
class for purposes of simplification. Thus, the present study deals 
with three classes as follows :
Upper Middle Class 5%
Lower Middle Class 38%
Working Class 57%
When the relationship between social strata and religious belief 
was examined, a definite difference could be noted among the classes. 
Three percent of those respondents categorized as "fundamentalists"
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were of upper middle class background, while 6% of the "modernists" 
and 14% of the "unbelievers" were of this origin.® Conversely, al­
though 59% of the fundamentalists and 62% of the modernists were of 
working class origin, only 44% of the unbelievers came from such 
backgrounds. Thus, while the total percentage of middle class respon­
dents (both upper and lower) was 41% for the fundamentalists and 39% 
for the modernists, fifty-six percent of the unbelievers were middle 
class. The following table illustrates these differences.
Table III - 4 






Un- All Re- 
Modernists believers spondents (N)
Upper Middle 3% 6% 14% 5% (21)
Lower Middle 38 32 42 38 (168)
Working 59 62 44 57 (255)
Total 100 100 100 100 (444)
P<.01
We may infer, then, that social class can have some bearing on 
the general religious philosophy of an individual. And, of course, 
fundamentalism decreases with an increase in the level of education, 
which can be correlated with social class to a great extent. Class
®The method for determining the religious belief category to which 
an individual belongs is explained in Chapter Six.
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differences in relation to religion have been noted by Lenski and 
Berelson and Steiner, among others.^ We now turn to the effect of 
social class on silent majority attitudes about civil liberties.
Civil Liberties
The determination of whether a respondent's attitude could
be called favorable, ambivalent or unfavorable toward civil liberties
was made in the following manner: Nine statements were utilized which
involved the concepts of free speech and assembly, censorship of books
and films, rights of the accused, freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure, private sex-related behavior, and the question of women's
rights in relation to abortion. The statements are as follows:
1. Constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly 
should not apply to American Communists.
9Lenski, op. cit., pp. 79-80, 323-327; Berelson and Steiner, op. 
cit., pp. 393-394. A paper by John Alston and Jack Balswick presented 
to the Society of the Scientific Study of Religion in October of 1970, 
emphasized that persons who answered "none" when questioned about their 
religion (by the Gallup polling organization) tended to be more afflu­
ent. These people proved to be disproportionately young, well educated, 
male, and in business and executive positions. They also are more like­
ly to be more liberal with respect to political questions, especially 
those of race. These findings were reported in an article entitled 
"irreligionists More Affluent" which appeared in the Oklahoma Journal 
(October 26, 1970).
^^Statement number 1 is an original. Statements 2 through 5 
(2 and 4 slightly modified) are from Comrey and Newmeyer, "Measurement 
of Radicalism-Conservatism," Journal of Social Psychology, 67 (1965), 
357-369. Statement 6 is a slight modification of a question used in a 
CBS News poll on the Bill of Rights, March 20, 1970. Statements 7 and 
8 (7 slightly modified) are from Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and 
Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 
(June, 1964), 361-382. Statement 9 is from an undated mimeographed 
sheet distributed by the Citizens Committee for Humane Abortion Laws.
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2. Our laws give too much protection to suspected criminals.
3. If a man is showing a sex movie to friends in his own 
home, the police should stop it.
4. Every city should ban objectionable books and movies.
5. The police should hunt down homosexuals and put them 
in jail.
6. If police suspect that drugs or guns, or other criminal 
evidence is hidden in someone's house, they should be 
allowed to enter the house without first obtaining a 
search warrant.
7. A book containing wrong political views should not be 
published, much less put in our libraries.
8. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is 
entitled to the same legal rights and protections as 
anyone else.
9. It should be a woman's right to decide whether or not 
she should have an abortion.
Respondents were asked to answer these statements with one of the following 
five choices: (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral or not
sure, (4) Agree, or (5) Strongly agree. Using the number preceding 
each answer, a mean was computed and the following civil liberties atti­
tude categories were devised:
Mean of 1.00-2,75, Favorable toward civil liberties 
Mean of 2.76-3.25, Ambivalent toward civil liberties 
Mean of 3.26-5.00, Unfavorable toward civil liberties
Note that the limits of the ambivalent category are 0.50 of one point, 
while those of the other two categories cover 1.75 points. The reason 
for using these particular limits should be explained. It is believed 
that persons who are uninformed or have a lack of interest in a subject 
may be likely to select more "not sure" or "don't know" answers than
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other respondents. Therefore, the purpose of narrowing the limits of 
the ambivalent category was to facilitate in distinguishing trends 
toward one polar direction or the other.
For that matter some researchers consider an ambivalent attitude 
to be actually unfavorable. In their book The Tenacity of Prejudice, 
Gertrude Selznick and Stephen Steinberg illustrate that respondents 
who give "don't know" answers to questions about Jews are highly sus­
ceptible to anti-Semitism. They also demonstrate that such answers 
reveal an indecisiveness which in turn indicates an unwillingness to
nexpress opposition to anti-Semitic bigotry. Such findings further 
indicate why a narrowing of the "middle ground" ambivalent responses 
was deemed desirable in the present study.
Among the Oklahoma collegiate silent majority respondents, a 
check of civil liberties attitudes found over two-thirds to be favor­
ably disposed with one in five ambivalent and one in ten unfavorable. 
When the sample was divided into social classes, however, differences 
emerged. Eighty-six percent of the upper middle class, as compared to 
71% of the lower middle and 64% of the working class, exhibited favor­
able attitudes. Ambivalent and unfavorable attitudes together totaled 
only 14% among upper middle class respondents. These findings regard­
ing the relationship between social class and civil liberties attitudes 
are akin to those of Lenski who, in his study of Detroiters, catalogued 
differences between middle and working class respondents. Using ques­
tions which dealt with criticism of the President of the United States
^^Review of Religious Research, 12 (1971), p. 56.
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verbal attacks on religion, and free speech and assembly for Communists
and fascists, Lenski found a mean difference of 19% and 8% between
middle and working class white protestants and white Catholics respec- 
12tively. As the following table illustrates, the upper middle class 
students had 15% more who were favorable toward civil liberties than 
the lower middle class, and 22% more than the working class. Compari­
son may also be made with Stouffer's findings that community leaders 
(who are more likely to be fairly high in the social strata) are more
likely to be civil libertarian than the general public, who, on the
13average, would be lower in the social strata.
Table III - 5 











Favorable 86% 71% 64% 68%
Ambivalent 10 21 24 22
Unfavorable 4 8 12 10
Total 100 ICO 100 100
(N) (21) (168) (255) (444)
p <  .05
Racial Attitudes 
In attempting to determine racial attitudes, four questions were 
asked which involve the concepts of having neighbors of another race.
13s.A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties, 
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), Chapter 2.
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integration or segregation in schools, dining in one's own home with a
14person of another race, and racial intermarriage.
The questions used in determining racial attitudes are as 
follows :
1. It would probably be better if black and white children
attended separate schools.
2. I would prefer to live in a segregated neighborhood.
3. Two persons of different races should not marry.
4. I would object if a member of my family brought a person
of another race home to dinner.
As in the case of the civil liberties questions, the choice of answers 
covered from (1) Strongly disagree, to (5) Strongly agree. The range 
of means for the categories follows:
Mean of 1.00-2.75, Integrationist 
Mean of 2.76-3.25, Ambivalent 
Mean of 3.26-5.00, Segregationist
Six in ten respondents fell into the integrationist category.
One in five was ambivalent and about one in five was a segregationist. 
There were no significant differences in racial attitudes among the
The question about black and white children attending separate 
schools is frcsn Clock and Stark, o£. cit., Chapter 10. The other 
three are modifications of questions used by Paul Sheatsley in "White 
Attitudes Toward the Negro," Daedalus, 95 (1966), 217-238. The term 
"race" has been used in the current study because it is more familiar 
to the general populace than the term "ethnic group." Many people 
refer to the "Jewish race" or "Mexican race" or "Irish race" when, 
in such cases, the term "ethnic group" would be more proper. It is 
quite possible that the phrase "person of another race" brings to 
mind various ethnic groups to some people, but to the overwhelming 
majority of Caucasians it means blacks, and vice versa.
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three classes, with integrationist views ranging from 61% to 67% and 
segregationist feelings from 17% to 20%. Even when the twenty-nine 
non-caucasians were eliminated, there was still no essential differ­
ence in the racial attitudes of the three classes. These findings 
differ from those of Lenski who stressed that "one finds a higher 
percentage of segregationists among the working c l a s s .
Table III - 6 











tionist 67% 62% 61% 61%
Ambivalent 14 18 22 21
Segrega­
tionist 19 20 17 18
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (21) (168) (255) (444)
Chi Square non-significant at the .05 level.
Accounting for this difference in findings is difficult. We may 
speculate that racial attitudes are more closely related to level of 
education and level of political information than to social class. 
Thus, once a person has reached college, class differences in racial 
views may narrow. As will be shown in a later chapter, significant
15Lenski, o£. cit., p. 209.
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differences in racial attitudes do occur among those with varying 
religious beliefs. This will be explored in Chapter Six.
Table III - 7 







Integrationist 67% 60% 60%
Ambivalent 14 19 22
Segregationist 19 21 18
Total 100 100 100
(N) (21) (159) (235)
Chi Square non-significant at the .05 level.
In this chapter, Hollingshead's "Two Factor Analysis of Social 
Position" was explained and was used to place respondents in one of the 
following social classes: upper middle, lower middle, or working class.
A  relationship was illustrated between religious belief and class with 
unbelievers being higher in social position than either fundamentalists 
or modernists.
An attempt was made to gauge the effect of social class on col­
lege students attitudes toward civil liberties and race. The data 
revealed that class has a significant bearing on beliefs about civil 
liberties with the upper middle class more favorably disposed than the 
lower middle which, in turn, was slightly more favorable than the 
working class.
Although investigations by others produced different results.
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in the current study social class did not have a significant effect 
on racial attitudes. This finding was unexpected, and it was sur­
mised that racial attitudes may be more closely related to amount of 
education and level of political information than to class, and once 
the individual reaches the college level class differences regarding 
racial attitudes tend to lessen. Racial attitudes are further ex­
plored in relation to religious belief in Chapter Six; in relation to 
level of political information in Chapter Eight; and in relation to 
candidate preference in Chapter Ten.
CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: 
AUTHORITARIANISM AND 
DOMESTIC COMMUNISM
The concept of authoritarianism or the "authoritarian person­
ality" involves a particular set of traits including strong tenden­
cies toward conformity, dependence on authority, rigidity in thought 
patterns, over-control or suppression of certain feelings and impulses, 
and a high degree of ethnocentrism. Those individuals having such 
traits cling to conventional values and are concerned with status and 
power. They "are generally hostile to members of minority or other 
outgroups." Further, "these traits belong together in such a way that 
a person who is high, low or average in some of them tends to be high, 
low or average in all of them.
The authoritarian syndrome was first given prominence by the 
work of Theodor W. Adorno and his collaborators in the 1950 book 
entitled The Authoritarian Personality. Although their basic purpose 
was to study anti-Semitism, "the authors concluded that anti-Semitism, 
with its prejudicial, anti-democratic attitudes, was in many cases part 
of a well-organized and much larger personality structure..." which 
"...tended to develop in persons who were subjected to very strict
^Robert M. Goldenson, The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, 
(Garden City: Doubelday and Co., 1970), p. 134.
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parental control early in life, and who had learned to bury their re­
sentments and adopt an attitude of acquiescence.Because of 
these factors such persons continued to be submissive toward authority 
after becoming adults; at the same time they expressed covert hos­
tility toward weak individuals or vulnerable groups which could be 
attacked with no involvement of risk.
Adorno's description of the authoritarian personality was quite 
like that of the ideal Nazi as described by Nazi psychologist E.R. 
Jaensch. Additionally, it was concluded that:
...acceptance or rejection of this cluster of prejudices 
was associated with the individual's over-all personality 
structure. In a word, people who were most apt to adopt 
anti-democratic attitudes were also found to exhibit an 
authoritarian personality structure.3
Since the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, the 
relationship of social class and authoritarianism has been of interest 
to political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists. Several 
studies have lent weight to the idea that authoritarianism is more 
prevalent in the lower social strata.'*
The method used for determining the level of authoritarianism 
of a respondent was the same as that used in categorizing beliefs with
^Ibid.
3%bid.
'*Theodor W. Adorno et al. The Authoritarian Personality, (New York; 
Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 267; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man,
(Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4; Arthur Niederhoffer, 
Behind the Shield, (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969), Chapter 5;
S.A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties, (New York:
Science Editions, 1965), p. 139.
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respect to civil liberties and racial attitudes. Students were in­
structed to record answers ranging from (1) Strongly disagree, to 
(5) Strongly agree to nine statements, eight of which are from Adorno's 
study. The other is from The Open and Closed Mind by Milton Rokeach.^ 
The statements are as follows :
1. The worst danger to real Americanism during the last 
fifty years has come from foreign ideas and agitators.
2. America is getting so far from the true American way 
of life that force may be necessary to restore it.
3. The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are 
nursery school stuff compared to some of the goings- 
on in this country today.
4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should learn.
5. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children 
deserve more than mere imprisonment ; such criminals 
ought to be publicly whipped or worse.
6. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does 
not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his 
parents.
7. Most people don't realize how much our lives are 
controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
8. What our youth need most is strict discipline, 
rugged determination, and the will to work and 
fight for family and country.
9. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this 
world there is probably only one which is correct.
As in previous cases (civil liberties and racial attitudes) the range
^Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1960). This particular statement is from Rokeach's 




Mean of 1.00-2.75, Low Authoritarian
Mean of 2.76-3.25, Ambivalent
Mean of 3.26-5.00, High Authoritarian
Better than one-third of the students scored high on authori­
tarianism with almost exactly one-third scoring low and less than one- 
third falling into the ambivalent category. Distinct differences in
Table IV - 1 












Low 48% 41% 29% 34%
Ambivalent 38 29 28 29
High 14 30 43 37
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (21) (168) (255) (444)
p<.01
the level of authoritarianism appeared among the three classes with 48% 
of the upper middle, 41% of the lower middle and 29% of the working 
class falling into the low authoritarian grouping. The working class 
had 43% in the high authoritarian category compared with 30% for the 
lower middle class and 14% for the upper middle class. Interestingly, 
the upper middle class had the largest percentage in the ambivalent 
category (38%). The finding that those lower in social class tend to 
be more authoritarian is consistent with the conclusions of previously 
cited studies.
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We now turn to an examination of student attitudes about the 
threat of domestic Communism and the influence of social class on such 
attitudes.
Beliefs About the Threat of Domestic Communism
America is a nation which has been not only mindful of the chal­
lenge of Communism but, seme critics maintain, unreasonably and irra­
tionally so. After WWI came the "Red Scare" period when the public 
and the national government, led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, 
became obsessed with left wing radicals, both real and imagined. From 
1950-1954, Senator Jospeh McCarthy was the leading voice in what has 
been called a witch hunt which, while uncovering no crypto-Reds, did 
harm to basic constitutional guarantees. During the late sixties 
and early seventies there have been, according to some commentators, 
attempts by the Department of Justice under Attorney General Mitchell 
to suppress dissent and link most of the dissenters with Communism. 
Presumably, the silent majority has been sympathetic to all such 
measures and a considerable number of them evidently believe that 
unless certain elements in our society are suppressed, America will 
eventually fall prey to internal Communism, be subverted, taken over. 
What sort of people are more likely to believe this? Studies of author­
itarianism have shown that high authoritarians are more likely to 
believe in the existence of conspiracies, and clandestine meetings in 
general, than are low authoritarians. Given this premise, we ask 
what groups are probably more likely to contain a significant percen­
tage of high authoritarians? One answer would be that less educated 
or less informed groups seemingly would contain more of such people.
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Those more likely to be less educated and uninformed would include
religious fundamentalists, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, and
the lower middle and working classes, comprising the great bulk of
the silent majority, which we will now examine.
The statement used to determine views on the danger of domestic
Communism and the importance of combatting it is from a study of
student attitudes toward Communists by Schonbar.^ The statement is;
Combatting Communism in the United States is the most 
serious domestic task facing our country today.
As before, respondents were asked to select one of these answers;
(1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Not sure or neutral,
(4) Agree, (5) Strongly agree. Slightly over half of the students 
disagreed with the statement, while about four in ten agreed. Eight 
percent were not sure.
When the student's views were examined by social class, differen­
ces became apparent. Twenty percent of the working class and 15% of 
the lower middle class answered with "Strongly agree." No upper 
middle class respondent gave that answer. Thirty-eight percent of the 
upper middle class strongly disagreed, while 20% of the lower middle 
and only 12% of the working class answered in this way.
The foregoing data lend support to the belief that an underlying 
preoccupation with subversion seems present in the thinking of a signifi­
cant portion of lower middle and working class students. The fact that 
four in ten viewed combatting Communism as the most serious domestic
^Rosalea A. Schonbar, "Student Attitudes Toward Communists," 
Journal of Psychology, 27 (1949), 55-71.
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Table IV - 2
Social Class and the Attitude Toward 
the Danger of Domestic Communism
Combatting Communism 










Strongly disagree 38% 20% 12% 16%
Disagree 33 38 35 36
Not sure 10 5 10 9
Agree 19 22 23 22
Strongly agree 0 15 20 17
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (21) (168) (255) (444)
p <.05
task reflects, perhaps, not only the reality of over twenty five years 
of Cold War and recent violence by the far left, but also some measure 
of success for the propaganda of the radical rightists, who have long 
maintained that Communists occupy high positions in government.
One aim of this chapter has been to discuss authoritarianism and 
to explore the relationship between authoritarianism and social class 
among college students. The data revealed that a positive relation­
ship does exist with working class students showing stronger authori­
tarian tendencies than those in the lower middle class who, in turn, 
were more authoritarian than the students from upper middle class 
families.
Another aim was to examine beliefs about Communism in America.
On this subject the lower middle and working class students exhibited
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considerably more concern about the danger posed by home-grown Reds than 
did the upper middle class respondents. That the working class students 
showed greatest concern was not surprising since they also tested most 
authoritarian and least favorable toward civil liberties. Such persons 
would, no doubt, be greatly concerned with any sort of non-conformity 
^ , and would have tendencies to relate unconventional behavior to Communism.
CHAPTER V
SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: 
WELFARISM AND POLITICAL INFORMATION
The terms liberal and conservative are often used loosely by 
Americans. If a person takes the position that combatting domestic 
Communism is a very important task he may be referred to by some as 
a "conservative." But what of the economic conservative who believes 
in taking a "hard line" with Russian and Chinese Communists, yet 
scoffs at the idea of any real danger from home-grown Reds? Is this 
person a liberal? These and related problems with ideological dis­
tinctions have led to the theory that there are different kinds of 
liberalism and conservatism. Indeed, there are at least four issue 
areas in which a given individual's liberalism or conservatism should 
be distinguished: domestic economic affairs, civil liberties, civil 
rights, and internationalism. A fifth area, the legislation of 
morality, could be considered under the heading of civil liberties, 
but was examined as a separate category in Lenski's Detroit study.
Free and Cantril have indicated that perhaps the best way to 
differentiate American liberals from conservatives lies with the 
issue of using the power of the national government to achieve social 
ends, i.e., the issue of welfarism.^ An individual's attitude on the
^Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans 
(New York; Clarion Books, 1968), Chapter 1.
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question of welfarism would involve his reaction to such issues as 
medical care for the aged and the very young, federal aid to educa­
tion, public housing, and perhaps even social security and the 
graduated income tax. If one opposed most such measures he could 
be considered conservative with respect to welfarism; if he favored 
most of them, he could be labeled a liberal in this area.
Free and Cantril also wanted to test the theory that what 
Americans say they believe and what they actually favor in practice 
in relation to welfarism are, to a substantial extent, in conflict.
To test this assumption they devised two sets of statements. One set, 
which taps "ideological" or theoretical liberalism or conservatism, 
they named the "Ideological Spectrum." The other set of statements, 
which they called the "Operational Spectrum," was devised to reveal
operational liberalism or conservatism, i.e., beliefs about welfarism 
2in practice. Thus, the two scales were devised to separate theory 
or ideology from practical or operational belief in matters of domes­
tic economic issues.
In using Free and Cantril's two Spectrums, it was necessary to 
modify some of the wording slightly, since seme of the issues referred 
to in their questions have become law. The five ideological Spectrum 
questions are as follows:
1. The Federal Government is interfering too much in 
state and local matters.
2. The government has gone too far in regulating business 
and interfering with the free enterprise system.
^Free and Cantril, o£. cit., Chapters 2 and 3.
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3. Social problems here in this country could be 
solved more effectively if the government would 
only keep its hands off and let people in local 
communities handle their own problems in their 
own ways.
4. Generally speaking, any able-bodied person 
who really wants to work in this country can 
find a job and earn a living.
5. We should rely more on individual initiative 
and ability and not so much on governmental 
welfare programs.
Respondents were asked to answer in one of the five previously mentioned 
ways (Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). The range of means used in 
constructing categories was the same as previously utilized:
Mean of 1.00-2.75, Liberal
Mean of 2.76-3.25, Middle of the Road
Mean of 3.26-5.00, Conservative
Free and Cantril's study found that in 1964 in response to 
questions on the Ideological Spectrum 50% of the citizens of the 
United States were conservatives, 34% were middle of the roaders, and 
16% were liberals. On the same scale students at the three Oklahoma 
colleges proved to be 45% conservative, 37% middle of the road, and 
18% liberal. Notable differences existed among the three social 
classes. But, surprisingly, these differences were directly opposite 
those noted by Free and Cantril, Lenski, and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and 
McPhee.^ Although there was virtually no difference between the lower
^Free and Cantril, op. cit., Chapters 2 and 3; Gerhard Lenski, 
The Religious Factor, Chapter 4; Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld 
and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1954), pp. 55-56.
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middle and working classes, both together proved to be less liberal 
and thus more conservative in their theoretical economic philosophy 
than did the upper middle class. This result was not expected. 
Usually it is those higher in class who tend to be more sympathetic 
toward economic conservatism.^ Yet it should be noted that Free and 
Cantril found only small Ideological Spectrum differences in the
Table V - 1




Ideological Spectrum Position 
Middle of Conser- 
the Road vative Total (N)
Upper Middle 29% 33% 38% 100% (21)
Lower Middle 18 38 44 100 (168)
Working 18 36 46 100 (255)
All Respondents 18 37 45 100 (444)
Chi square non-significant at .05 level.
liberalism and conservatism of three income groupings : under $5,000
per year, $5,000-$9,999 per year, and over $10,000 per year. A table 
based on their findings follows.^
'‘Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, Human Behavior (New York; 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 426-427; Gerhard Lenski, The 
Religious Factor (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), 
Chapter 4.
^This table and the following are based on data frcxn Free and 
Cantril, p. 221.
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Table V - 2
Income and the Ideological Spectrum 
(Free and Cantril)
Ideological Spectrum Position 
Middle of
Yearly Income Liberal the Road Conservative
Under $5,000 18% 33% 49%
$5,000-$9,999 14 37 49
$10,000 and up 18 28 54
Still, when Free and Cantril applied class identification group­
ings to the Ideological Spectrum those identifying with the working 
class were clearly more liberal and less conservative than those 
identifying with the middle and propertied classes.
Table V - 3
Class Identification and the Ideological Spectrum 
(Free and Cantril)
Ideological Spectrum Position 
Class Middle of
Identification Liberal the Road Conservative
Working Class 21% 35% 44%
Middle Class 13 32 55
Propertied Class 4 33 63
The findings of the present study differ from those of Free and 
Cantril and Lenski. No explanation for this discrepancy seems readily 
available but it should be remembered that those studies dealt with a 
1964 national sample and a 1958 Detroit cross-section, respectively.
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while the current study surveyed only college students. Further, 
a considerable portion of the students identified with a higher class 
than the one in which an objective determination placed them. It was 
noted in Chapter Three that 41% of the working class students and 64% 
of the lower middle class students considered themselves to be upper 
middle class.
Turning our attention to the Operational Spectrum, we note the 
following statements (some slightly modified) which make up this 
instrument :
1. Federal aid to education includes grants to help pay 
for teachers' salaries. Are you;
(1) For this (2) Against this (3) Not sure
2. "Medicare" for the elderly is financed out of social 
security taxes. In general do you feel that you:
(1) Approve of this (2) Disapprove of this (3) Not sure
3. Under the federal housing program the Federal Government 
is making grants to help build low-rent public housing.
Do you think the government spending for this purpose 
should be:
(1) Kept at least at the present level (2) Reduced 
(3) Ended altogether
4. Under the urban renewal program, the Federal Government 
is making grants to help build run-down sections of our 
cities. Do you think government spending for this pur­
pose should be;
(1) Kept at least at the present level (2) Reduced 
(3) Ended altogether
5. The Federal Government has a responsibility to try to 
reduce unemployment and to try to do away with poverty 
in this country.
(1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) Not sure
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The respondent was considered conservative if he was against at 
least three of the statements and agreed with no more than one. If 
against three and for two or vice-versa, he was considered middle of 
the road. He was also considered middle of the road if he was for 
or against no more than two. If he favored at least three statements 
and opposed no more than one, he was considered liberal.
Table V - 4





the Road Conservative Total (N)
Upper
Middle 81% 14% 5% 100% (21)
Lower
Middle 71 24 5 100 (168)
Working 74 22 4 100 (255)
All
Respondents 73 23 4 100 (444)
Chi square non--significant at .05 level .
Utilizing the Operational Spectrum, Free and Cantril found that 
their national sample consisted of 65% liberals, 21% middle of the 
roaders, and only 14% conservatives. Social class had little effect 
on Operational Spectrum differences among the Oklahoma students. But 
as before, the small difference was toward the upper middle class 
being more liberal; eighty-one percent versus 71% for the lower middle 
and 74% for the working class.
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Free and Cantril also found that 74% of those who identified with 
the interests of the working class, 57% of those who identified with 
the interests of the middle class, and 40% of those who identified with 
the propertied class were Operational liberals. Further, by utilizing 
annual income as a variable, they found that of those who made under 
$5,000 per year 73% were operationally liberal; those in the salary 
ranges of $5,000-$9,999 and $10,000 and over had liberal percentages 
of 62% and 53% respectively. The following table compares Free and 
Cantril's class identification and income groupings with the three 
classes used in the current study.
Table V - 5
Comparison of Free and Cantril's National Sample 
with the Oklahoma Collegiate Sample
Operational Spectrum Position
Middle of Conserv­
Social Strata Liberal the Road ative
Upper Middle Class Students (Okla) 81% 14% 5%
Identify with Propertied Class (F & C) 40 34 26
Income over $10,000/year (F & C) 53 25 22
Lower Middle Class Students (Okla) 71 24 5
Identify with Middle Class (F & C) 57 24 19
Income $5,000-$9,999/year (F & C) 62 24 14
Working Class Students (Okla) 74 22 4
Identify with Working Class (F & C) 74 17 9
Income under $5,000/year (F & C) 73 16 11
A  particularly interesting finding of Free and Cantril was that 
a considerable number of ideological conservatives and middle of the 
roaders were, at the same time, operational liberals: 46% of the
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conservatives and 78% of the middle of the roaders. The investigation 
of the Oklahoma College students produced a similar pattern, except 
that an even greater percentage of ideological conservatives (60%) 
were operational liberals. A comparison of the findings of the two 
studies is illustrated in Table V - 6.
Table V - 6
Ideological Spectrum (Theoretical Welfarism) vs. 






Free s Cantril 90% 9% 1%
Oklahoma students 90 10 0
Middle of the Road
Free & Cantril 78 18 4
Oklahoma students 80 19 1
Conservative
Free & Cantril 46 28 26
Oklahoma students 60 31 9
Free and Cantril concluded that although the welfare state does 
not have wide acceptance in theory, it is well accepted in practice. 
The data on the Oklahoma collegiate silent majority supports this. 
Although presumably imbued with ideas about "rugged individualism" 
and the "free enterprise system," Oklahoma students, in the manner of 
the majority of Americans, accept economically liberal policies in 
practice. The resulting lack of congruity between ideology and policy 
may be further illustrated by comparing the respondent's position on 
the Ideological and Operational Spectrums with his self identification
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as a liberal, conservative, etc. Twenty-one percent identified 
themselves as liberal, 38% as middle of the road, 26% as conservative. 
Radical right, radical left and "other" were each chosen by 1%; twelve 
percent said they were non-political. Only 47% of those who were 
liberals on the Ideological Spectrum and 25% of the Operational Spec­
trum liberals identified themselves as such. In fact, 10% of the 
Ideological Spectrum liberals identified themselves as conservatives 
and 4% called themselves radical rightists.
Table V - 7 
Self Identification of Political Ideology
Liberal
Free and Cantril 26%
Oklahoma students 21
Middle of the Road
Free and Cantril 34
Oklahoma students 38
Conservative
Free and Cantril 30
Oklahoma students 26
Not even half of those who were liberal or middle of the road on 
either the idelolgical or Operational Spectrum identified themselves 
in that manner. The same held true for Ideological conservatives; only 
34% identified themselves as such. Fifty-three percent of the Opera­
tional conservatives, however, called themselves by that name. These 
results lend weight to the idea that most Americans are not ideologi­
cally oriented; words such as liberal, conservative, etc., while having 
some meaning for them, are not well understood in their implications.
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As Free and Cantril indicated, the public is apt to think of the terms 
liberal and conservative in relation to welfarism. Yet much of the 
sample of Oklahoma college students, like the national sample of 1964, 
did not seem to understand with any great consistency what their 
beliefs entailed.
Level of Political Information 
Using information questions that have been asked over the years 
by various polling organizations, the general political knowledge of 
the students was tested. Ten questions, eight multiple choice with 
five answers, one fill-in and one open ended, were used. One of the 
five possible answers to each multiple choice question was "I'm not 
sure," and this response was actually the correct answer to one of the 
questions, since it dealt with identifying a non-existent organization. 
The people, organizations and concepts the students were asked about 
included: U Thant, Mao Tse Tung, filibuster, the number of senators
in Washington from their state, Lenin, the Stand Up for America League, 
the first amendment to the United States Constitution, the Mann Act, 
and the three branches of the national government. The ten questions 
may be found in the Appendix.
On the basis of the number of correct answers, students were 
categorized as "informed," "moderately informed," or "uninformed." 
Eight or more correct answers placed a respondent in the informed 
category. Seven or six correct answers placed him in the moderately 
informed, and five or less in the uninformed bracket.
The entire sample proved to be 34% informed, 37% moderately in­
formed, and 29% uninformed. These findings are not overly different
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from what many public opinion specialists have maintained about the 
total United States population. Also, the uninformed percentage 
might have been lower had not four of the questions dealt with inter­
national affairs. Most studies have shown that Americans know less 
about foreign than domestic issues, and Free and Cantril found fully 
two-fifths of the public to be uninformed with reference to inter­
national affairs. They cited polls which showed that in 1964 one-forth 
of the public did not know that mainland China was controlled by a 
Ccanmunist regime. And while 71% could identify Charles de Gaulle 
(whose name had been in the news quite often in 1964), only 40% knew 
who U Thant was.^
Social class had a significant effect on the Oklahoma college 
sample. The upper middle class respondents were 53% informed compared 
to 35% for the lower middle and 31% for the working class. The lower 
middle class had the largest percentage who were moderately informed; 
41%, compared with 34% for the working class, and 33% for the upper 
middle. Only 14% of the upper middle and 23% of the lower middle 
classes were uninformed, but 35% of the working class students fell 
into this category. Thus, while 86% of the upper middle and 77% of the 
lower middle classes were at least moderately informed politically by 
the criteria used in this investigation, less than two-thirds of the 
working class students achieved this steuidard.
®Free and Cantril, op. cit., pp. 59-60; see also Robert Lane 
and David Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1964), Chapter 6.
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Table V - 8 








Upper Middle 53% 33% 14% 100% (21)
Lower Middle 36 41 23 100 (168)
Working 31 34 35 100 (255)
All Respon­
dents 34 37 29 100 (444)
p <.05
These results may be thought to confirm one writer's observation 
"...that differences in information held in a cross-section population 
are simply staggering, running from vast treasuries of well-organized 
information among elites interested in the particular subject to frag­
ments that could virtually be measured as a few 'bits' in the technical
sense."7
This chapter has been an attempt to examine the effect of social 
class on attitudes toward welfarism and level of political information 
among the collegiate silent majority, utilizing Free and Cantril's 
Ideological Spectrum and Operational Spectrum it was found that social 
class had little effect on beliefs aibout welfarism either in theory or 
practice. While differences among the classes were not statistically 
significant, the upper middle class had the highest percentage of
^Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 
in David E. Apter (ed.). Ideology and Discontent (New York; The Free 
Press, 1964).
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liberals with respect to both theoretical, welfarism (29% to 18%) and 
practical welfarism (81% to 74%). These results were unlike those 
of previous studies which found more support for economic conservatism 
in the higher social strata. We may speculate on this discrepancy by 
noting that the present study dealt with college students, a large 
number of which identified with a higher social class than their own.
The collegiate silent majority certainly could not be called 
economic conservatives in practice. The data reveal that they were 
even more liberal on the Operational Spectrum than a 1964 national 
sample.
Social class and level of political information showed a definite 
relationship with the upper middle class students being notably better 
informed than the rest of the sample. The working class respondents 
were the least informed group.
CHAPTER VI
RELIGION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES; 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RACE
The effect of religious beliefs upon attitudes has been discussed 
by Balswick, Brannon, Clock and Stark, Hong, Lenski, and Rokeach among 
others.1 It is the purpose of this chapter and the next two to ex­
plore the consequences of certain religious beliefs upon students' 
dispositions in relation to civil liberties, racial attitudes, authori­
tarianism, domestic Communism, welfarism, and the Indochina War. In 
addition, it was felt important to leeirn if religious beliefs have 
any effect on the individual's level of political information.
Religious preferences of the students were what might be expected 
in Oklahoma except for the over-representation of Church of Christ and 
Nazarene respondents due to the religious affiliations of two of the 
three colleges. (Recall that Bethany Nazarene College furnished 110 
respondents and Oklahoma Christian College 118.) The denominational 
breakdown showed the following: 27% preferring the Church of Christ;
Jack Balswick, "Theology and Political Attitudes Among the Clergy," 
Sociological Quarterly, 11 (Summer, 1970), 397-405; R.C.L, Brannon,
"Gimme That Old Time Racism," Psychology Today (April, 1970) ; Charles 
Clock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs emd Anti-Semitism (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1966), Chapters 5 and 7; Lawrence Hong, "Religious 
Styles, Dogmatism and Orientation to Change," Sociological Analysis,
27 (1966), 239-242; Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (Garden City: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4; Milton Rokeach, "Faith, Hope 
and Bigotry," Psychology Today (April, 1970), and also "Value Systems
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23.2% Nazarene; 18.5% Baptist; 6.3% Methodist; 5.4% "other;" 4.5% 
Catholic; 3% Lutheran and Episcopal; 2.4% Presbyterian; 1.8% Disciples 
of Christ and "none;" 1.5% Assembly of God; and 1% agnostic or athiest. 
Preferences of less than 1% included Church of God, Congregational, and 
Jewish. Included in the "other" categoiry were such diverse groups as 
Christian Science, Free Methodist, Freewill Baptist, Independent 
Christian, Mormon, Religious Science, United Church of Christ, United 
Pentecostal, and Unitarian. Respondents from three groups —  Church of 
Christ, Nazarene and Baptist —  comprised better than two-thirds of the 
total sample and almost 80% of the fundamentalists.
Although the particular religious denomination (or sect) in which 
one was raised or with which one identifies no doubt can have a signifi­
cant effect on his overall attitudes, it seems that the religious beliefs 
of each individual would be more important in shaping these attitudes.
Two people who are Methodists may have diametrically opposed views 
on such issues as abortion, civil rights, the death penalty, foreign 
policy, etc. It is quite possible, perhaps even probable, that these 
same two Methodists will have divergent views regarding the divinity 
of Jesus, the inspiration of the Bible, belief in miracles, a literal 
hell, the necessity of being a Christian, etc. Thus it might be sur­
mised that knowing whether or not a respondent is a religious funda­
mentalist would provide a better clue to his other beliefs than knowing 
what church he attends would provide. Our prime concern, then, is with
in Religion" and "Religion and Social Compassion," Review of Religious 
Research, 11 (Fall, 1969), 3-39; Rodney Stark et al, "Sounds of Silence," 
Psychology Today (April, 1970) and Wayward Shephards; Prejudice and 
the Protestant Clergy (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
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the individual's system of belief rather than his denominational 
preference.
Since the focal point of this chapter is to examine what effect 
the individual's religious philosophy has upon certain political at­
titudes, it was necessary to construct religious belief categories: 
"fundamentalist," "modernist," and "unbeliever." The students were 
placed in these categories based on the manner in which they responded 
to statements dealing with belief in the following; God, the divinity 
of Jesus, miracles as described in the Bible, hell as described in the 
Bible, the Devil, and the necessity of being of a particular religious 
faith in order to attain salvation. These statements follow. On the 
first two the five answers were (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree,
(3) Not sure or neutral, (4) Agree, and (5) Strongly agreer as described 
in Chapter Three. The other four had answers which involved varying 
degrees of acceptance or rejection of each concept. The first two 
statements dealing with religion are as follows:
All the miracles described in the Bible really happened.
Hell, as described in the Bible, actually exists.
The other four questions were prefaced with these instructions:
The following questions are multiple choice. Please pick 
the answer that most nearly expresses your opinion and 
place the number of that answer in the blank to the left 
of the question.
Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing 
what you believe cüaout God?
5. I know God really exists and I haven't any doubts about it,
4. While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.
3. I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not 
at other times.
2. I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in 
a higher power of some kind.
1. I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe 
there is any way to find out.
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The Devil actually exists.
1. Definitely not true
2. Probably not true
3. Possible, but doubtful
4. Probably true
5. Completely true
Do you think belief in Jesus Christ as Savior is...
5. Absolutely necessary for salvation
4. Probably necessary for salvation
3. Would possibly help
2. Probably has little influence
1. Probably has no influence
Do you think being a member of your particular religious faith is.
5. Absolutely necessary for salvation
4. Probably necessary for salvation
3. Would probably help
2. May have some influence
1. Probably has no influence
Such factors as belief in the Biblical hell, the Devil, miracles, 
and the necessity of accepting the divinity of Jesus were considered 
as denoting a fundamentalist. The lack of such beliefs coupled with 
affirmation of a supreme being placed the respondent in the modernist 
category. To be categorized as an unbeliever, the respondent, in ad­
dition to rejecting orthodox beliefs, had to answer the question about 
God with "I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe 
there is any way to find out." To be categorized a fundamentalist the 
respondent had to give answer number 4 or 5 to at least four of the 
six statements dealing with religious belief.
Using these criteria, the sample turned out to be 82% fundamen­
talists, 8% modernists and 10% unbelievers. This is quite different 
from a national sample of college students taken by the Gallup organi­
zation in January of 1971. Thirty-nine percent of that sample stated 
that religion is old-fashioned and out of date. Among the reasons
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given for this belief the students mentioned that religion cannot pro­
vide answers to today's problems; it is behind the times and too 
steeped in tradition to be effective; it has too many rules; it is 
used as a crutch to avoid facing reality; it places too much emphasis 
on money and is held back by its leaders. Another Gallup poll taken 
in late April and early May of 1970 found 58% of a national student 
sample answering "no" to the question "Is organized religion a relevant 
part of your life at the present time, or not?" This poll found that 
the higher a student's parents' income, the more likely he was to 
answer in the negative, with better than two-thirds of those whose 
family income was over $15,000 per year saying that organized religion 
was not relevant in their lives.
In the present study, thirty of the unbelievers answered the 
question regarding religious preference by selecting names of denomi­
nations rather than by marking "none" or "agnostic or athiest."
Many of these respondents no doubt chose the church in which they 
had been raised. Thirty percent, however, were still attending church 
with at least moderate regulcurity, which lends support to the old adage 
that a lot of unbelievers go to church.
No doubt one-third (probably more actually) of the people in this 
category are not unbelievers in the traditional sense of that term.
Some are almost unquestionably mystics or doubters who want evidence 
before they will accept certain doctrines. Others include Unitarians, 
many of whom prefer not to be called unbelievers. Such persons gener­
ally adhere to the conviction that whether or not Jesus was divine, or 
whether or not a supreme being exists are not important (not even mean­
ingful) questions. But, they affirm, the ethical teachings of religion
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Table VI - 1 





Religious Belief Category 
% % % 
Mod. Unbeliever Total (N)
Assem. of God 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.5 (6)
Baptist 19.0 23.5 9.0 18.5 (82)
Catholic 2.7 11.8 14.0 4.5 (20)
Ch. of Christ 32.0 3.0 0.0 27.0 (119)
Ch. of God 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.7 (3)
Congregational 0.3 6.0 0.0 0.7 (3)
Disc, of Christ 1.6 0.0 4.7 1.8 (8)
Episcopal 1.0 3.0 16.0 2.7 (12)
Jewish 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.2 (1)
Lutheran 2.0 11.8 2.3 3.0 (13)
Methodist 4.0 26.5 9.0 6.3 (28)
Nazarene 27.8 0.0 2.3 23.2 (103)
Presbyterian 1.0 3.0 11.6 2.4 (10)
Other 4.9 11.8 4.7 5.4 (24)
None 0.5 0.0 14.0 1.8 (8)
Agnostic or 
Atheist 0.0 0.0 9.3 0.9 (4)
Total* 99.2 100.4 99.2 100.6
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
* Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.
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(all religions) are important and should be stressed at the expense 
of (and without the hinderance of) dogmatic creeds. No doubt many 
people with such beliefs consider themselves quite religious. If 
they have a concept of a supreme being, it is a highly personal 
concept; they do not accept the idea that God looks like a male 
Caucasian with a beard. Most modernists, of course, also reject 
such a concept and a number probably hold a quasi-deistic view. This 
involves the belief in a supreme being who created, but who does not 
interfere in the affairs of humans.
At any rate, respondents in the unbeliever category should not 
be thought of in terms of the doctrinaire village atheist, doing 
verbal battle with theologians and writing nasty letters to the local 
newspaper denouncing Jesus as a first century snake oil salesman.
Although about two-thirds of the students stated that they attend 
church at least once a week, frequency of attendance differed with 
regard to both religious belief category and social class. Whereas 
35% of the modernists and 30% of the unbelievers claimed to attend 
religious services at least two to three times per month, eighty-five 
percent of the fundamentalists asserted this frequency of attendance, 
with 76% stating that they attend at least once a week. Nearly one- 
third of the modernists and over half of the unbelievers stated that 
they had not attended church in the last year or that they attend 
"seldom." Only 5% of the fundamentalists gave comparable responses.
The following table illustrates the relationship between religious 
belief category and church attendance.
Table VI - 2 














last year Total* (N)
Fundamen­
talist 76% 10% 9% 3% 2% 100% (367)
Modernist 15 21 32 15 18 101 (34)
Unbeliever 19 11 19 19 33 101 (43)
All
Respondents 65 11 12 6 6 100 (444)
♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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The relationship of social class and church attendance had a 
pattern similar in some respects to that of religious belief cate­
gory and attendance. While attendance habits of the modernists 
(those in the middle religiously) more nearly resembled those of 
the unbelievers, the lower middle class students' (those in the 
middle class-wise) frequency of attendance was closer to that of 
the working class than the upper middle. The upper middle class, 
like the unbeliever group, had the greatest percentage of respond­
ents reporting that they had not gone to church in the last year, 
or attend "seldom." These findings are at least partially consis­
tent with Kahl's assertion that lower middle class people are the
2most regular church goers in America. There was no significant 
difference, however, in the attendance patterns of the lower middle 
and working class students.
Another method was used to determine not only religious belief, 
but just how far some individuals would go in letting such beliefs 
overlap into other areas. The question, slightly modified but 
almost the same as one used by Lenski in his Detroit study, was;
In politics, would you prefer a candidate who bases his
campaign on:
1. His belief in God and the American way of life
or
2. A discussion of political and economic problems
2Joseph Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1957), Chapter 7.
Table VI - 3 










Not in the 
Seldom last year Total (N)
Upper
Middle 48% 5% 9% 14% 24% 100% (21)
Lower
Middle 67 11 11 5 6 100 (168)




Lenski found that fully 60% of his sample preferred the man who 
based his campaign on God and the American way of life.^ The Oklahoma 
students, being of higher average educational attainment than Lenski's 
Detroit respondents, would be expected to have a smaller percentage 
favor the man whose campaign was based on a glittering generality, 
and indeed they did. Still, virtually half (49%) preferred such a 
candidate, while 51% wanted campaigns based on a discussion of politi­
cal and economic issues, as compared to only 23% of Lenski's san\ple. 
Thus, even though attending college, almost half the students reacted 
favorably, in a way which might even be described as a conditioned 
response, to the familiar symbols of "God" and "the American way of 
life."
Though this question divided the respondents in such a way that 
many fundamentalists were placed in the same grouping with the modern­
ists and unbelievers, there is reason to believe that this method re­
vealed the "hard core" of the fundamentalists. Interestingly, three 
modernists and two unbelievers joined this hard core, attracted per­
haps by the phrase "the American way of life." As will be demonstra­
ted, two categories of respondents demarcated by this one question on 
"campaign philosophy" tended to exhibit rather diverse views on other 
issues. This is especially true with regard to civil liberties, racial 
attitudes, position on both the Ideological and Operational Spectrums, 
acceptance of demonstrations, and attitude toward the war in Indochina.
^Lenski, op. cit., p. 177.
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Table VI - 4
Preference for Campaign based on God 












talist 58% 42% 100% (367)
Modernist 9 91 100 (34)
Unbeliever 5 95 100 (43)
Civil Liberties
The findings of Balswick, Clock and Stark, Rokeach, and Stark 
et al, strongly suggest that religious fundamentalists tend to have 
less favorable attitudes toward civil liberties than do non-funda-
4mentalists. Balswick's study of political attitudes among the 
clergy showed a significant difference in dispositions toward civil 
liberties between theological liberals and fundamentalists, with 60% 
of the fundamentalists and none of the liberals believing that all 
Communists in America should be put in jail.
Clock and Stark found that 57% of the Southern Baptists and 54% 
of the sect members in their sample believed that an atheist should not 
be allowed to teach in a public highschool, while only 33% of the
^Balswick, op. cit. ; Clock and Stark, 0£. cit.; Rokeach, 
op. cit. ; Stark et op. cit.
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Congregationalists and Methodists believed this. Further, they found 
that while fewer than one Congregationalist in five would prevent an 
atheist from teaching in a private university, almost half the sect 
members would deny the unbeliever this right.^
Rokeach discussed findings which show the religiously devout 
to be "more bigoted, more authoritarian, more dogmatic and more anti­
humanitarian than the less devout."^ Rokeach did not find himself in 
agreement with Allport and Ross that although churchgoers in general 
are more bigoted than nonchurchgoers, those who attend church occasion­
ally are the most bigoted of all. In Rokeach's sample, frequency of 
church attendance made virtually no difference; regular churchgoers 
were just as intolerant as those whose attendance was irregular.
Using his Value Survey, Rokeach also found that the unbelievers, Jews 
and Episcopalians in his sample had somewhat different values than 
did the Baptists. This supports the theory that modernists and un­
believers have different attitudes than do fundamentalists.
Lenski stated that he found no interrelation between religious 
liberalism and political liberalism except for a modest relationship 
between religious liberalism and support for freedom of speech.? The
Clock and Stark, pp. cit., Chapter 5. Included among their list 
of sects are: Assembly of God, Church of God, Church of Christ, Church 
of the Nazarene, Seventh Day Adventists, Four Square Gospel and an inde­
pendent tabernacle. The authors applied the term sect to this group of 
religious bodies "in conformity with common sociological usage." (p. 5). 
Since the Church of Christ has trained clergy, formalized services, and 
formal organization, they probably should not be considered a sect by 
Clock and Stark's criteria.
^Rokeach, "Faith, Hope and Bigotry," op. cit.
7Lenski, 0£. cit., p. 211.
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findings of the current study are that a highly significant relation­
ship exists with regard to civil liberties in general. The fundamen­
talists were less favorable toward civil liberties than were the mod­
ernists and unbelievers.
The method for categorizing respondents as favorable, ambivalent 
or unfavorable toward civil liberties utilized nine statements involving 
such concepts as freedom of speech and assembly, censorship of books 
and films, rights of the accused, freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure, private sex-related behavior, smd women's rights in relation 
to abortion. (The statements and their origins are listed in Chapter 
Three.) Students were asked to respond to the statements with one of 
the following answers: (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Not 
sure or neutral, (4) Agree, (5) Strongly agree. The range of means is 
the same as has been used throughout this study:
1.00-2.75, Favorable toward civil liberties 
2.76-3.25, Ambivalent toward civil liberties 
3.26-5.00, Unfavorable toward civil liberties
Sixty-two percent of the fundamentalists had favorable attitudes, 
but 97% of the modernists and 93% of the unbelievers were favorable.
And although the fundamentalists were 26% ambivalent and 12% unfavorable, 
3% of the modernists and 7% of the unbelievers, respectively, were 
ambivalent; none were among the unfavorable attitude group.
When social class was held constant, the results were quite simi­
lar. Although upper middle class fundamentalists tested more civil 
libertarian than lower middle and working class fundamentalists, they
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Table VI - 5











Favorable 62% 97% 93% 68%
Ambivalent 26 3 7 22
Unfavorable 12 0 0 10
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
p <.001
were still less so than all modernists and unbelievers. While 77% of 
the upper middle class fundamentalists were favorable toward civil 
liberties, no class of modernists or unbelievers had less than 90% 
favorable and two classes had 100% favorable (excluding the upper 
middle class modernist category which had only two respondents). In 
this case it appears that religious belief is perhaps a more important 
factor than social class as an influence on civil liberties attitudes.
The relationship between religious belief and attitude toward 
civil liberties was also explored through use of the question from 
Lenski concerning whether respondents preferred a candidate whose cam­
paign was based on God and the American way of life, or an a discussion 
of political and economic issues. As mentioned earlier, this question 
seemed to delineate the "hard core" of the fundamentalists. Whereas 
62% of all fundamentalists exhibited a favorable attitude toward civil
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Table VI - 6
Civil Liberties Attitude as a Function of 










Favorable 77% 67% 58%
Ambivalent 15 23 28
unfavorable 8 10 14
Total 100 100 100
(N) (13) (139) (215)
Modernists
Favorable 100% 91% 100%
Ambivalent 0 9 0
unfavorable 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100
(N) (2) (11) (21)
Unbelievers
Favorable 100% 90% 95%
Ambivalent 0 10 5
Unfavorable 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100
(N) (6) (18) (19)
liberties, only 49% of the "hard core" group did so.® And while the 
latter group had 20% with unfavorable attitudes, the entire fundamen­
talist group had 12% unfavorable. In ambivalence the groups were simi­
lar with 31% and 26%, the higher percentage belonging to the "hard core."
8Recall that the "heurd core" group includes three modernists and 
two unbelievers, in addition to 211 fundamentalists.
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Comparing the "hard core" with the group preferring a candidate 
basing his campaign on issues, we note that only 2% of the latter 
group presented an unfavorable civil liberties attitude, while in the 
former 20% displayed this attitude. Additionally, while close to 
nine in ten of the issue-oriented cluster exhibited favorable attitu­
des, just under half of the God-and-American-way oriented group did so.
Also in the realm of civil liberties are attitudes toward protest 
demonstrations. Peaceful demonstrations are, of course, a medium of 
expression and thus protected by the First Amendment. Unfortunately, 
from the civil libertarian viewpoint, a majority of the American public 
disapproves of any sort of demonstrations, even peaceful ones.
Table VI - 7
Preference for Campaign based on God or Issues 




















Converse and his associates found that in their national sample taken 
in 1968, only 20% approved of "taking part in protest meetings or
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marches that are permitted by the local authorities,"® Further, this 
same study found that almost 40% of those who took a "dove" stemd on 
the Vietnam war believed that the Chicago police had not used enough 
force in quelling the demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic conven­
tion; better than two-thirds rejected the idea that too much force 
had been used.
Two questions relating to demonstrations were used. The first 
of these was :
If a friend of yours informed you that he was going 
to take part in a non-violent demonstration to pro­
test something he considered to be wrong, would you;
1. Strongly approve
2. Approve
3. Be unsure or neutral
4. Disapprove
5. Strongly disapprove
Fifty-four percent of the total sample approved of friends taking 
part in such a demonstration, 17% disapproved and 28% were unsure. 
Fundamentalists attitudes on this question differed noticeably frœn 
those of other students. No modernist or unbeliever disapproved of 
non-violent demonstrations, but one in five fundamentalists registered 
disapproval. And although nearly two-thirds of the modernists and 86% 
of the unbelievers gave approval to such demonstrations, only half the 
fundamentalists did so.
Holding social class constant produced comparable results. Al­
though better than two-thirds of the upper middle class fundamentalists
Philip Converse et "Continuity and Change in American Poli­
tics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political 
Science Review, 63 (December 1969), 1083-1105.
71
Table VI - 8
















Strongly approve 14% 18% 35% 16%
Approve 36 47 51 38
Unsure 29 35 14 28
Disapprove 16 0 0 13
Strongly disapprove 5 0 0 4
Total* 100 100 100 99
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
p <.01
♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
approved of taking part in non-violent demonstrations, only about half 
of the lower middle and working class fundamentalists approved. This 
decline in approval concomitant with descent in social class also oc­
curred among modernists, but did not hold true with respect to un­
believers. In fact, working class unbelievers approved of such demon­
strations by a margin of 95% as compared with 83% of the upper middle 
class unbelievers. (No inference was made concerning the upper middle 
class modernists because of the small number of respondents.)
The other question concerning demonstrations was:
Please indicate with a check mark the statement or 
statements which are acceptable to you:
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1. Violent demonstrations are acceptable in many 
situations.
2. Violent demonstrations are acceptable in some 
situations.
3. Non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in 
most situations.
4. Non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in 
some situations.
5. No demonstrations are acceptable to me; not 
even non-violent ones.
Better than half the respondents took a cautious pose with 
respect to demonstrations. Sixteen percent stated that no type was 
acceptable to them and 40% thought non-violent types to be acceptable
Table VI - 9
Attitude Toward Non-Violent Demonstrations as a 












Disapprove 23 26 31
Not sure 8 22 22
Total 100 100 100




Disapprove 50 18 43
Not sure 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100




Disapprove 17 22 5
Not sure 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100
(N) (6) (18) (19)
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in some situations. The largest gap between the modernists and funda­
mentalists occurred on the issue of not accepting any demonstration. 
One fundamentalist in five opposed all types, while no modernist 
answered in this way. Interestingly, 6% of the unbelievers opposed 
all demonstrations.
Table VI - 10 
Demonstration Acceptance and Religious Belief
Demonstration
Acceptance
Religious Belief Category 
Fundamen- Modem- Un- All
talist ist believer Respondents
None are acceptable 19% 0% 6% 16%
Non-violent accept­
able in some situa­
tions 43 38 23 40
Non-violent accept­
able in most situa­
tions 34 59 59 38
Violent acceptable 
in some situations 4 0 9 4
Violent acceptable 
in many situations 1 3 2 1
Total 100 100 99 99
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
p<.01
Dividing the sample through the use of Lenski's question concern­
ing preference for a candidate who bases his campaign on God and the 
American way or on political and economic issues found the "hard core" 
of fundamentalists less favorably disposed toward demonstrations than 
the remainder of the sample. The largest attitude gaps occurred on the
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statements "no demonstrations are acceptable," and "non-violent 
demonstrations are acceptable in most situations." Almost one-fourth 
of the "hard core" as compared with one-tenth of the issue-oriented 
group asserted that no demonstrations were acceptable to them. And 
although close to half of the issue-oriented respondents answered 
that non-violent demonstrations were acceptable in most situations, 
less than one-third of the hard core answered this way. There was 
virtually no difference in the attitude of the two groups with re­
spect to the acceptance of violent protests. (Of course, there is 
no civil liberties question involved where violent demonstrations 
are concerned. The U.S. Constitution makes no provision for such 
protests, and it is generally accepted that he who employs violence 
should expect it in return.)
In contrast to these results, a mid-1970 poll of 7300 students, 
taken by Playboy magazine on nearly 200 campuses, found 14% believing 
"violence is the only way to make the establishment respond," and 
another 33% believing violence "justified only when provoked by author­
ities."^^ Thus, 47% of a national college sample considered violent 
means legitimate under certain conditions. Only 5% of the Oklahoma 
students took such a position.
It may be seen, then, that the findings of this study strongly 
support the idea that religious fundamentalists tend to be anti-civil-
lOpiayboy, (September, 1970). A previous poll of 1542 college 
seniors taken in the spring of 1970 by the Center for Research and 
Development in Higher Education at Berkeley found that 19% believed 
disruptive tactics and destruction of property cire often necessary to 
change the status quo. Another 9% believed that physical confrontation 
and violence must be used at times. Fifty-two percent stated that non­
violent mass protests are the only feasible way to bring change. Only 
1% believed in no type of demonstration.
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libertarian in comparison with modernists and unbelievers, though in 
this sample only 12% fell into the unfavorable category (see Table VI-5) 
Such findings conflict with Lenski's view that there is little, if any, 
correlation between religious liberalism and political liberalism 
in this regard. Of course, Lenski's findings applied to a Detroit 
cross-section in the late fifties, while the present findings apply 
to central Oklahoma college students in the early seventies.
Table VI - 11
Preference for Campaign Based on God or Issues, 









None are acceptable 23% 10%
Non-violent acceptable 
in some situations 41 40
Non-violent acceptable 
in most situations 31 46
Violent acceptable in 
some situations 4 4
Violent acceptable in 




What explanation may be offered for fundamentalist views regard­
ing civil liberties? A plausible interpretation is that persons who 
view religion in terms of right versus wrong with not much middle ground 
(or perhaps as Christ versus anti-Christ) cire more likely to apply
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similar thought patterns to other realms, i.e., the political. Such 
people feel they know what is right and judge accordingly. There is 
not much sympathy for the rights of those who deviate. Dissenters 
are evil and deserving of few, if any, rights. Women wanting abortions, 
to their way of thinking, should not indulge in sexual relations in the 
first place. Or, as one male fundamentalist put it, "If they don't 
want to get pregnant, they shouldn't be screwin'." In short, fundamen­
talists seem far more likely to believe that if a person does not con­
form within certain narrow limits of tolerable behavior, he deserves 
any unpleasant consequences he may suffer. (If somesone is indulging 
in "immoral" behavior such as showing a sex movie in his own home 
and his constitutional rights are violated, so what?) Rights, to 
an alarming percentage of fundamentalists, are for those who "do right." 
As one female fundamentalist who strongly favored the death penalty 
put it; "Live right or don't live at all." Whether such thinking is 
carried over into the area of racial attitudes will be examined in the 
following section.
Racial Attitudes 
The aforementioned poll by Playboy magazine (September, 1970) 
found the issue of racial conflict tied for second place along with 
the environmental issue in the minds of college students. (The war 
in Indochina headed the list.) Despite such student concern, many 
Americans, collegians included, are either indifferent to racial prob­
lems or express outright hostility to aspirations for equality by 
blacks and other minorities.
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Studies by Stark and others have revealed that, unfortunately,
the major portion of this indifference and hostility comes from the
devoutly religious. In this regard Stark stated:
Recent studies by Milton Rokeach...strongly confirmed 
and extended our earlier findings that belief in 
Christian teachings is often incompatible with con­
cern for Christian ethics. Many clergymen say in des­
pair that their sermons seem to fall on deaf ears;
that people are able to compartmentalize their lives
so that prejudice, hatred, and selfishness remain 
unaffected by messages from the pulpit.
But messages from the pulpit are by no means necessarily balanced
in favor of racial equality. Balswick's study of clergymen found that
of those who held a conservative theological position, almost three-
quarters were unfavorable toward civil rights, while only one-fifth
of the theologically liberal had unfavorable attitudes. In addition.
Stark and others found that fewer than one Southern Baptist or Missouri
Synod Lutheran in ten had preached on a controversial subject five times
in one year. The average among Protestant clergymen was three such 
12sermons per year.^^
Brannon has mentioned that attitude surveys have consistently 
shown churchgoers to be significantly more racially prejudiced than 
non-churchgoers. "This is true even among people of the same age, 
educational level and geographic region," according to Brannon, who
^^Stark et o£. cit.
l^Balswick, 2 2. cit.; "Sermons Shun Controversy," Oklahoma 
Journal (May 25, 1971. This artical summarized some of the find­
ings of Stark et ^  in their new book. Wayward Shepherds : Prejudice 
and the Protestant Clergy, published by Harper and Row. The book 
itself was not available at the time of this writing.
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also has stated:
The finding that church members are more prejudiced 
than other people is not without irony in view of the 
teachings of Jesus Christ about the brotherhood of man. 
Some critics of religion have gone so far as to charge 
that racial and ethnic intolerance is a natural exten­
sion of religious precepts. They cite the bias in such 
ideas as God's chosen people, infidel heresy, unsaved 
souls and Gott mit uns.^^
Glock and Stark's Sam Francisco Bay Area study found that such
fundamentalists as Southern Baptists, Missouri Synod Lutherans and
sect members held more stereotyped and bigoted attitudes towaird Negroes
than did such modernists as Congregationalists, Episcopalians and
Methodists, and were therefore more likely to favor racial segregation.
Whereas fewer than one-fourth of the respondents who belonged to these
three modernist groups felt it would be better if blacks and whites
attended separate churches, over half of the sect members and two-thirds
of the Southern Baptists believed in Sunday segregation. And while only
13% of the Methodists believed in segregation of schools, 46% of the
Southern Baptists favored this measure. As to the Communists-in-the-
civil-rights-movement bogey, seventy percent of the Southern Baptists
and 61% of the sect members agreed that "The races would get along
fine in this country if Communists and other radicals didn't stir up
trouble." Comparatively, one-third of the Congregationalists, 36% of
the Methodists and 45% of the Episcopalians believed this statement 
14to be accurate.
l^Brannon, 0£. cit.
l^Glock eind Stark, 0£. cit., Chapter 10.
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Racial attitudes of students in the three religious belief 
categories were obtained by utilizing four questions involving the 
following; the integration of schools and neighborhoods, dining
with a person of another race and
Table 
Racial Attitude








Attitude talist . ist. believer Respondent
Intégrâtionist 57% 76% 75% 61%
Ambivalent 23 12 13 21
Segregationist 20 12 12 18
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
Chi square non-significant at .05 level.
The fundamentalists registered a higher percentage of segregation­
ists (or racists) and a lower percentage of integrationists than the 
other two categories (which were essentially the same). Fifty-seven 
percent of the fundamentalists were integrationists, while three- 
quarters of the modernists and unbelievers held pro-integration atti­
tudes. Twenty percent of the fundamentalists were segregationists and 
23% were ambivalent, while among the modernists and unbelievers the 
segregationist and ambivalent respondents were just over one in ten.
Of special interest are the results obtained after the non- 
caucasians had been eliminated from the sample. Although very small 
percentage changes were noted in the fundamentalist and unbeliever
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categories, the modernist pro-integration percentage rose from 76% to 
84%, the ambivalent percentage dropped from twelve to six, and the 
segregationist from twelve to ten. The strong indication in this 
instance is that a number of the non-caucasians in this sample were 
modernists who held ambivalent racial attitudes.
Table VI - 13
Racial Attitude and Religious Belief (Caucasians only)
Religious Belief Category
Racial
Attitude Fundamentalist Modernist Unbeliever
Integrationist 57% 84% 74%
Ambivalent 22 6 13
Segregationist 21 10 13
Total 100 100 100
(N) (345) (31) (39)
P <.01
Although not as strong as expected, a relationship exists between 
fundamentalism and segregationist attitudes. Why such a relationship 
is not so strong as that found by Balswick or Glock and Stark could 
possibly be related to the general intégrâtionist attitude which 
prevails to some extent at Oklahoma Christian College. This school 
has had many black athletes, one of whom (Jeff Bennett) was among the 
top five decathlon men in the United States during the late sixties.
He almost single-handedly put Oklahoma Christian "on the map." The 
data presented on the three colleges (Chapter Nine) supports this 
contention, as OCC tested considerably less "racist" than Bethany 
Nazarene.
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While the fundamentalists exhibited more of a proclivity toward 
racism than the modernists or unbelievers, the "hard core" group ex­
hibited still stronger tendencies in that direction. Those favoring 
a campaign based on God and the American way registered about one- 
half integrationists, one-fourth ambivalent and one-fourth segregation­
ists. Those favoring a campaign based on a discussion of issues were 
almost three-quarters integrationists, 15% ambivalent and 14% segre­
gationists.
Table VI - 14

















Holding social class constant produced results which were not so 
clear cut as those related to civil liberties. For instance, the cate­
gories containing the highest percentage of segregationists were upper 
middle class and lower middle class fundamentalists and lower middle 
class unbelievers. The highest percentage of integrationists occured 
among working class unbelievers, working class modernists and lower 
middle class modernists in that order. The only group which contained
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no segregationists was the upper middle class unbelievers, which, 
oddly, was 50% ambivalent.
Table VI - 15












Ambivalent 0 20 26
Segregationist 23 22 18
Total 100 100 100




Ambivalent 0 9 4
Segregationist 50 9 10
Total 100 100 100




Ambivalent 50 11 5
Segregationist 0 22 5
Total 100 100 100
(N) (6) (18) . (19)
Although fundamentalists seem more likely to hold views which might 
be described as racist, the "hard core" (preferring a campaign based on 
God and the American way) who seem to want all beliefs and actions re­
lated to their particular concept of a supreme being appear to have an 
even higher percentage of racists.
l^Some persons object to the term "racist" and maintain that the 
term "segregationist" is a more accurate description of their positions. 
This appears to be an exercise in semantic hair-splitting. Racism 
might be defined as the belief that there is ah inherent difference
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It seems fair to say that in this study just over one in ten
unbelievers and one in ten modernists could be considered a racist,
while two in ten fundamentalists and almost one-fourth of the "hard
core" exhibit such tendencies. An explanation for fundamentalist
attitudes in this regard might be found in a statement by Rodney Stark:
If a man believes that everyone controls his own 
destiny, he is likely to be intolerant of the 
weaknesses of others and to blame the disadvantaged 
for their own misery. The result is resistance to the 
civil rights movement and to large scale attempts to 
improve the lot of minority groups.
And Milton Rokeach has added:
...it seems more accurate to say that it is a lack of com­
passion rather than political conservatism that would prompt 
a person to believe that blacks are basically less intelli­
gent than whites, or that blacks have failed to achieve 
equality because they lack initiative, or that the poor 
remain poor because they are lazy.
The general picture that emerges...is that those who 
place a high value on salvation are...anxious to maintain 
the status quo and are unsympathetic to the black and the 
poor.17
among the races that cannot be accounted for by environment, coupled 
with the idea that one race is superior. If this definition is accepted, 
it seems likely that 99% of those who call themselves segregationists 
are racists and therefore the terms may be used interchangeably.
l^Playboy,(June, 1968), p. 47. A more recent article by Melvin 
J. Lerner in Psychology Today (June, 1971) lends support to Stark's 
statement. The article, "All the World Loathes a Loser," discusses 
findings which strongly indicate that Americans tend to condemn those 
they feel they cannot help, on the ground that such people must deserve 
what they are receiving. "A religious person may view suffering as a 
test of faith in the will of God or as a clear sign that the victim is 
being punished for some sin. It doesn't matter whether the suffering 
is seen as a hidden blessing or as punishment; the sufferer will be 
rewarded later, or else he deserves to suffer."
17Rokeach, "Faith, Hope and Bigotry," 0£. cit.
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All points considered, this sample of the collegiate silent 
majority should not be described as primarily racist since only 18% 
are out-and-out segregationists and 61% definitely seem to favor 
integration. These findings no doubt contrast with the attitudes 
of the student's parents, the overwhelming majority of whom must have 
attended segregated schools, did not go to college, and had little 
social interaction with Negroes. What interaction most had was when 
blacks worked for them as domestics or yard keepers. Their offspring, 
having known blacks on a different basis —  classrooms, athletic 
fields, gymnasiums, etc. —  exhibit different attitudes from their 
parents.
This chapter has focused on the effects of religious belief 
on civil liberties and racial attitudes. Highly significant differ­
ences existed among the three belief categories' —  fundamentalist, 
modernist and unbeliever —  attitudes toward civil liberties with 
the fundamentalists being considerably less civil libertarian than 
the other two groups. Still, six fundamentalists in ten held favor­
able attitudes in this area. Even when social class was held constant, 
the fundamentalists tested as clearly less civil libertarian.
On racial questions the three religious belief categories showed 
smaller differences with three-quarters of the modernists and un­
believers and 57% of the fundamentalists taking an integrationist 
position. The fundamentalists also had about twice the number of 
ambivalent respondents and close to twice the number of segregationists 
as the other two groups. Most racist in outlook was the "hard core" 
category with about one-half integrationists, one-fourth ambivalent 
and one-fourth segregationists.
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In sum, nearly seven in ten of this collegiate silent majority 
sample were favorable toward civil liberties and six in ten were 
integrationists.
CHAPTER VII
RELIGION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: AUTHORITARIANISM 
AND DOMESTIC COMMUNISM
The concept of authoritarianism involves rigidity in thinking, 
strong tendencies toward conformity, adherence to conventional values, 
high ethnocentrism and anti-democratic attitudes. Those individuals 
who cleave to religious fundamentalism, which evidently involves 
rigidity and conventional values, would seem on the face of it more 
likely to be high in authoritarianism than would modernists or un­
believers.
The findings of Glock and Stark and Rokeach appear to support 
this contention.^ The sociologists, Glock and Stark, found that 
members of fundamentalist churches, such as Southern Baptist, Church 
of Christ and Nazarene, were more likely to have cuiti-democratic and 
anti-Semitic attitudes than members of such modernist churches as 
Congregational, Episcopal, Methodist and Presbyterian. The psychologist, 
Rokeach, found that Baptists ranked being "broadminded" lower as a 
value than did unbelievers and adherents of modernist groups.
The foregoing findings, then, suggest not only that fundamental­
ists would more likely be high in authoritarianism, but also that the
Charles Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti- 
Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Milton Rokeach, "Faith, 
Hope and Bigotry," Psychology Today (April, 1970).
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"hard core" group in the present study would be the most authoritar­
ian of any category. Indirectly suggested also is a relationship 
between frequency of church attendance and authoritarianism. Funda­
mentalists attend more often than others, therefore, such an attendance- 
authoritarian relationship is suggested.
The Oklahoma collegiate silent majority claimed to attend church 
with great regularity. More than three-quarters of the sample stated 
that they attend at least two to three times per month and about two- 
thirds stated that they attend at least once a week. Only 6% said 
they attend "seldcan" and another 6% affirmed that they had not been 
to church in the last year.
When the sample was divided into the three levels of authoritar­
ianism, distinct differences in church attendance patterns became 
evident. The high authoritarians claimed to attend church considerably 
more frequently than the ambivalent group which in turn claimed to 
attend with only slightly more regularity than the low authoritarians. 
Fully 81% of the high authoritarians stated that they attend at least 
once a week, while 54% of the low authoritarians affirmed attendance 
at this same frequency. Conversely, while 7% of the low authoritarians 
attend seldom and 12% had not been to church in the last year, com­
parable figures for the high authoritarian groups were 4% "seldom" 
and 1% "not in the last year." The ambivalent group fell between the 
other two with 58% attending at least once a week and 6% not having 
been to religious services in the last year.
A similar pattern emerged among the three religious belief 
categories. Seven in ten unbelievers were low authoritarians and 
fewer than two in ten were high. The fundamentalists by contrast
Table VII - 1 
















Low 54% 12% 15% 7% 12% 100% (153)
Ambivalent 58 15 14 7 6 100 (127)
High 81 7 7 4 1 100 (164)
03
p <  .001
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had only three in ten low and better than four in ten high. The 
modernists, interestingly, had 41% low, 50% ambivalent and only 
9% high authoritarians.
Table VII - 2 











Low 30% 41% 70% 34%
Ambivalent 28 50 14 29
High 42 9 16 37
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
p<.001
To check the speculation that the hard core group would have the 
greatest portion of authoritarians, the "God or Issues" question of 
Lenski was utilized. As suspected, those who preferred a campaign 
based on God and the American way of life proved higher in authoritar­
ianism than any other category. Only 22% of this group tested low and 
50% high as compared with 47% low and 24% high for the issue oriented 
group. Of course the additional fundamentalists joining the modernists 
and unbelievers in the issue-oriented group raised the percentage of 
high authoritarians in that category.
When social class was held constemt, the results did not change 
significantly. Upper middle class fundamentalists not only tested more 
authoritarian than modernists and unbelievers of the same class, but
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Table VII - 3
















also more so than modernists and unbelievers of lower middle and work- - 
ing class origin. For example, only 31% of the upper middle class 
fundamentalists were low authoritarians, while among the unbelievers 
83% of the upper middle, 72% of the lower middle and 63% of the work­
ing class tested low. And while 23% of the upper middle class funda­
mentalists were high in authoritarianism, only 5% of the working class 
modernists and none of the upper middle class unbelievers had this 
characteristic. True to the previous pattern, the upper middle class 
fundamentalists proved less authoritarian than other fundamentalists. 
(As previously mentioned, upper middle class modernists have not been 
discussed due to the insignificant number of respondents in that 
category.)
Authoritarian attitudes are strongly associated with religious 
fundamentalism among the collegiate silent majority. Even upper middle
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Table VII - 4
Authoritarianism as a Function of 












Ambivalent 46 31 26
High 23 33 48
Total 100 100 100




Ambivalent 50 27 62
High 0 18 5
Total 100 100 100




Ambivalent 17 11 16
High 0 17 21
Total 100 100 100
(N) (6) (18) (19)
class fundamentalists tested more authoritarian than lower middle or 
working class modernists or unbelievers. We now turn from authoritar­
ianism to the relationship between religious belief and attitude 
toward the importance of combatting domestic Communism.
Attitude Toward Domestic Communism 
The attitude of the general American public emd especially the 
silent majority with regard to domestic Communism has been mentioned 
in Chapter Four, where it was noted that the lower middle éuid working 
classes seem especially concerned by the threat of Communism within
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the United States. It might be expected that religious fundamentalists 
would be most concerned with domestic Communism and that perhaps they 
would tend to view the challenge of that ideological movement in high­
ly emotional terms —  such as Christ versus anti-Christ. This expec­
tation was tested through the use of the previously used statement 
concerning the seriousness of the task of combatting Communism in 
America today.
As expected, the fundamentalists were considerably more con­
cerned about internal Communism than were the other two groups. One 
in five strongly agreed and one in four agreed that combatting Com­
munism is the most serious dcxnestic task facing our nation today. By 
comparison, less than one modernist or unbeliever in ten strongly 
agreed and only slightly more than one believer in ten even agreed. 
Further, while only one-eighth of the fundamentalists strongly dis­
agreed, one-fourth of the modernists and one-third of the unbelievers 
took this position. When the "Strongly agrees" and "Agrees" were com­
bined and the same was done with the total "Disagrees" it was noted 
that three-quarters of the unbelievers disagreed that internal 
Communism is our most serious problem, but less than half of the 
fundamentalists disagreed. The modernists were much like the un­
believers with 70% disagreeing. And while only one modernist or un­
believer in five agreed with this statement, better than two funda­
mentalists in five agreed.
Interestingly, the agree and disagree responses of the funda­
mentalists matched those of the working class almost exactly, while 
those of the unbelievers had a striking similarity to those of the 
upper middle class. The modernists, however, saw domestic Communism 
as a less serious problem than did the lower middle class.
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Table VII - 5
Religious Belief and Attitude Toward Domestic Communism
Combatting Communism 
is the most serious 













Strongly disagree 13% 26% 33% 16%
Disagree 34 44 42 36
Not sure 9 9 7 9
Agree 24 17 12 22
Strongly agree 19 3 7 17
Total♦ 99 99 101 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
p <.01
♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Table VII - 6
Religious Belief and Attitude Toward Domestic Communism
Religious Belief Category
Combatting Communism 
is the most serious 











Disagree 47% 70% 75% 52%
Not sure 9 9 7 9
Agree 43 20 19 39
Total♦ 99 99 101 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
P<.01
♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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Table VII - 7
Attitude Toward Domestic Communism, 
Religious Belief and Social Class
Combatting Communism is the most 




Social Class Disagree . Not sure Agree Total* (N)
Fundamentalist 47% 9% 43% 99% (367)
Working Class 47 10 43 100 (255)
Modernist 70 9 20 99 (34)
Lower Middle Class 58 5 37 100 (168)
Unbelievers 75 7 19 101 (43)
Upper Middle Class 71 10 19 100 (21)
♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
When social class was held constant and the religious belief cate­
gories were examined for attitudes toward domestic Communism, a definite 
pattern was evident. Within each category the upper middle class stu­
dents were the least concerned about Reds in America and the working 
class respondents were the most concerned. There was virtually no 
difference in the attitudes of upper middle class fundamentalists and 
working class modernists. In both groups about three in ten agreed 
with the statement and about six in ten disagreed. The working class 
unbelievers were somewhat less concerned with nearly seven in ten dis­
agreeing and about two in ten agreeing. The largest contrast was 
between the working class fundamentalists and the upper middle class un­
believers. Close to half of the former group agreed with the state­
ment while in the latter group no one did so. (As previously noted,
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Table VII - 8
Attitude Toward Domestic Communism as a Function 
of Social Class and Religious Belief
Combatting Communism 
is the most serious 










Not sure 8 6 11
Agree 31 41 46
Total 100 100 100




Not sure 0 9 10
Agree 0 9 29
Total 100 100 100




Not sure 17 0 11
Agree 0 22 21
Total 100 100 100
(N) (6) (18) (19)
the upper middle class modernist group was too small for conclusions 
to be drawn about it.)
This chapter has examined the association between religious 
belief and authoritarianism, and between religious belief and attitudes 
toward domestic Communism. The data show that religious fundamental­
ism and authoritariemism are strongly related among the collegiate 
silent majority. Only three fundamentalists in ten were low in auth­
oritarianism compcired with seven in ten unbelievers. At the same 
time, only 9% of the modernists and 16% of the unbelievers were high
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in authoritarianism, compared with 42% of the fundamentalists. The 
"hard core" group was even more authoritarian with half in the high 
category and only one in five in the low. Holding social class 
constant produced similar results: the fundamentalists were still 
the most authoritarian group.
As might have been anticipated, given the data on civil liber­
ties and authoritarianism, the fundamentalists were considerably 
more concerned with the threat of domestic Communism than were the 
modernists and unbelievers. Better than four in ten fundamentalists, 
as compared with two in ten of the other two belief categories, saw 
combatting Communism as the most serious domestic task facing 
America today.
CHAPTER VIII
RELIGION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES; WELFARISM, 
POLITICAL INFORMATION AND THE INDOCHINA WAR
Lenski found no relationship between religious liberalism and 
political liberalism with respect to ideas about welfarism.^ Con­
versely, Balswick found definite differences in attitudes toward 
welfarism among theologically liberal and theologically conservative 
clergymen. Although the theological liberals were more likely to 
favor a liberal welfare policy by 56% to 24%, this relationship was 
not as strong as that between theological liberalism and favorable 
attitudes toward civil liberties or civil rights. Balswick attri­
buted this weaker relationship to the possibility that "more of the 
theologically conservative pastors...minister to lower class congre­
gations, and thus may be in personal contact with some families who
have benefited from welfare programs...(which) may cause a slight
2altering of their generally conservative political views."
On Free and Cantril's Ideological Spectrum, a device which 
measures theoretical liberalism or conservatism in relation to wel­
farism, segments of the Oklahoma collegiate silent majority showed
^Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, pp. 208-211.
2Jack Balswick, "Theology and Political Attitudes Among the 
Clergy," Sociological Quarterly, 11 (Summer 1970), 397-405.
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definite differences in attitude. The greatest percentage of conserva­
tives occurred among the fundamentalists with the modernists having 
the smallest percentage and the unbelievers falling between these two. 
The unbelievers had the greatest percentage of liberals with 37%, 
while the fundamentalists had the least with 15%.
Table VIII - 1













Liberal 15% 30% 37% 18%
Middle of 
the Road . 38 38 23 37
Conserva­
tive 47 32 40 45
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
p <.01
Clearly the religious "liberals" in this study were also the most 
liberal on theoretical economic matters. Such findings parallel those 
of Balswick and directly conflict with those of Lenski. When attitudes 
toward welfarism in practice were considered, however, a different 
pattern emerged. Utilization of Free and Cantril's Operational Spectrum, 
a device which measures actual policy beliefs in relation to welfarism, 
revealed no significant differences in attitudes among the three reli­
gious belief categories. All were quite liberal, with no group having
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even one in ten in the conservative camp. The unbelievers came closest 
to consistency, being the only category with even half as many theoret­
ical liberals as practical liberals. The modernists had less than 
two-fifths the number of theoreticals as practicals, and the fundamen­
talists only about one-fifth. Thus the unbeliever group, which, it 
should be remembered, averaged highest in social class, turned out to 
be the most internally consistent with regard to ideas about welfarism. 
The fact has been stressed (in Chapter Five) that 60% of the theoret­
ical economic conservatives in this study were at the same time 
operational liberals.
Table VIII - 2












Liberal 72% 82% 75% 73%
Middle of 
the Road 24 12 16 23
Conserva­
tive 4 6 9 4
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
Chi square non-significant at .05 level.
Although the fundamentalists tested more conservative emd there­
fore less liberal in the area of theoretical welfarism than the mod­
ernists and unbelievers, the hard core group proved to be the most
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conservative of all. Only 10% were liberals, but 55% were conserva­
tives on the Ideological Spectrum. Their counterpart, the issue- 
oriented group tested 26% liberal and 35% conservative. Once again, 
the hard core proved most conservative.
Table VIII - 3
Preference for Campaign Based on God or Issues, and 
















p <  .01
Even in the area of operational welfarism the hard core group was 
less liberal than any other, but not significantly so.
An examination of attitudes about welfarism and religious belief 
with social class held constant produced interesting results. With 
respect to theoretical welfarism no consistent pattern was evident. 
Upper middle class fundamentalists and working class modernists were 
the least conservative groups and also had the greatest percentages of 
middle of the readers. Upper middle class unbelievers and working 
class fundamentalists were the most conservative with the former group
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Table VIII - 4
Preference for Campaign Based on God or issues and 















Chi square non-significant at .05 level.
having no middle of the readers. The most liberal group was the working 
class unbelievers with 42% followed by upper middle and lower middle 
class unbelievers and working class modernists. Each of these three 
groups had 33% liberals.
Attitudes toward welfarism in practice were equally muddled. The 
most liberal group was the upper middle class unbelievers who were 100% 
in the liberal category. They were followed by the lower middle class 
and working class modernists and lower middle class unbelievers. The 
working class unbelievers, who were the most liberal group in respect 
to theoretical welfarism with 42%, were the least liberal with regard 
to practical welfarism with 63%. This factor, however, made them the 
most nearly consistent group. That is, the relationship between their 
attitudes toward theoretical and operational welfarism were closer than 
that of any other group.
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Table VIII - 5
Theoretical Welfarism (Ideological Spectrum) as a 












Middle of the Road 46 40 36
Conservative 23 46 50
Total 100 100 100




Middle of the Road 50 27 43
Conservative 50 46 24
Total 100 100 100




Middle of the Road 0 33 21
Conservative 67 33 37
Total* 100 99 100
(N) (6) (18) (19)
*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
The results of this study conflict with those of Lenski and are 
closer to those of Balswick, i.e., a relationship between religious 
and political liberalism in the area of welfarism does appear to exist.
It should be stressed, however, that this is on the issue of welfarism 
in theory. The present study found no statistically significant dif­
ferences among religious belief categories on the issue of practical 
welfarism. As in Free and Cantril's national sample, a considerable per­
centage of the respondents were theoretical economic conservatives, but 
very few (one in twenty) were practical conservatives.
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Table VIII - 6
Practical Welfarism (Operational Spectrum) as a 












Middle of the Road 23 27 22
Conservative 8 3 4
Total 100 100 100




Middle of the Road 0 9 14
Conservative 0 9 5
Total 100 100 100




Middle of the Road 0 11 26
Conservative 0 11 11
Total 100 100 100
(N) (6) (18) (19)
Level of Political Information 
As discussed in Chapter Five, ten questions dealing with subjects 
such as NATO, Mao Tse Tung, U Thant, filibuster, senators, Lenin and 
the first amendment were used to test the general political knowledge 
of the Oklahoma college students. Eight or more correct answers cate­
gorized a respondent as "informed," six or seven as "moderately informed," 
and five or less as "uninformed." The data have already shown that 
political information is significantly related to social class (See Chapter 
Five). It was also suspected that political information would be related
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to religious belief. Since fundamentalists have been found more 
likely to be from the lower social strata, they might tend to have 
less political information. This proved to be the case with one- 
third of the fundamentalists being informed, about one-third being 
moderately informed and about one-third being uninformed. The 
modernists were slightly more knowledgeable with 35% informed and 
24% uninformed. The unbelievers, however, tested 44% informed, 47% 
moderately informed and only 9% uninformed.
Table VIII - 7 














Informed 33% 35% 44% 34%
Moderately
Informed 35 41 47 37
Uninformed 32 24 9 29
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
p<.05
When social class was held constant it was found that upper mid­
dle class fundamentalists were the second most knowledgeable group 
with 61% in the informed category and 16% uninformed. Only the lower 
middle class unbelievers had more political information: sixty-one 
percent informed and none uninformed.
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Among the fundamentalists and modernists, social class made a 
definite difference in the level of political information with a larger 
proportion of uninformed concomitant with a descent in class. This did 
not hold true, however, with the unbelievers. When the percentage of 
uninformed were considered by religious belief and social class, the 
results were:
Category %Uninfomed Total N
upper Middle Class Fundamentalists 16 13
Lower Middle Class Fundamentalists 27 139
Working Class Fundamentalists 36 215
Upper Middle Class Modernists 0 2
Lower Middle Class Modernists 9 11
Working Class Modernists 33 21
Upper Middle Class Unbelievers 17 6
Lower Middle Class Unbelievers 0 18
Working Class Unbelievers 16 19
The results of examining the effects of religious beliefs on 
political knowledge raised the question as to whether the better in­
formed politically would more likely be civil libertarians and inte- 
grationists than the less informed. An analysis of the data answered 
this question in the affirmative in both cases.
Three-quarters of the informed were favorable toward civil lib­
erties, while only 7% were unfavorable. The uninformed, on the other 
hand, were 58% favorable and 12% unfavorable, while the moderately in­
formed fell between these two.
With respect to racial attitudes, the informed were better than 
two-thirds integrationists, while the uninformed had slightly over half 
in the intégrâtionist category. The uninformed had a considerable per­
centage who were ambivalent, cuid there was no significant difference 
among the three groups with respect to the segregationist category.
106
Table VIII - 8
Political Information and Attitude 
Toward Civil Liberties
Attitude Toward Civil Liberties
Level of
Political
Information Favorable Ambivalent Unfavorable Total (N)
Informed 76% 17% 7% 100% (151)
Moderately
Informed 68 20 12 100 (163)
Uninformed 58 30 12 100 (130)
p<.05
Table VIII - 9












Informed 68% 13% 19% 100% (151)
Moderately
Informed 61 23 17 101 (163)
Uninformed 53 28 19 100 (130)
p<.05
*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Attitude Toward the Indochina War 
For ten years now American men have been fighting in Indochina. 
United States battle deaths are nearing the fifty-five thousand mark 
and over three hundred thousand South Vietnamese have supposedly been
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killed. It is not surprising that the previously mentioned mid-1970 
Playboy poll found the war in Indochina to be uppermost in the minds 
of a sample of 7300 American college students.^ Thirty-nine percent 
picked this military action as the single most important issue, and 
65% of the total sample said that the United States should at least 
speed up the rate of withdrawal. In fact, 36% stated that we should 
pull out now. Twenty-six percent favored the Nixon Administration's 
timetable and only 9% believed that we should fight for a total vic­
tory no matter what.
But while a clear majority of college students in 1970 were im­
patient about the war, this feeling did not hold true for those in 
their twenties who had previously attended college. Converse and 
Schuman found that such people were more likely than their elders 
of grade school education both to justify the Indochina conflict and 
to support the intensification of it. Many of the college educated 
in this group were people who had been out of school for several years, 
and people who had not graduated from college or had only attended 
junior college. Less than one-quarter of the sample ever had any con­
tact with a school where a strong anti-war feeling prevailed. Converse 
and Schuman also noted that most sentiment against the war was of the 
"we have not won and have little prospect of doing so" variety.'*
With these facts in mind we turn our attention to the Oklahoma collegiate
^Playboy (September, 1970). The September 1971 issue of Playboy 
carried the results of a similar poll which showed that pollution had 
become the most vital issue with the war in second place, closely 
followed by overpopulation.
4philip Converse and Howard Schuman, "Silent Majorities and the 
Viet Nam War," Scientific American, 222 (June, 1970) 17-25.
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silent majority, a group attending three colleges in the fall of 1970
where little anti-war feeling existed.
The attitude of the Oklahoma sample was gleaned by using a
slightly modified question from Converse and Schuman's study:
There is much talk about "hawks" and "doves" in 
connection with Vietnam, and considerable dis­
agreement as to what action the U.S. should take 
in Vietnam. Some people think we should do every­
thing necessary to win a complete military victory, 
no matter what the results. Scane think we should 
withdraw completely from Vietnam right now, no matter 
what the results. Other people have opinions some­
where between those two extreme positions. On the 
scale below please place an X above the number which 
you feel indicates your opinion regarding Vietnam.
Immediate Withdrawal Complete Military Victory
The results looked like this:
Immediate Withdrawal Complete Military Victory
7% 12% 15% 13% 21% 12% 16%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
On balance, the total sample leaned in a hawkish direction. Vir­
tually half chose numbers 5, 6 or 7, while 34% chose 1, 2 or 3, and 18% 
placed themselves in the center at 4. The largest difference occurred 
at the extreme ends of the spectrum with 7% choosing 1 on the Immediate 
Withdrawal end and 16% preferring 7 on the Complete Militiary Victory end.
When the sample was broken down into religious belief categories, 
the picture was somewhat different with the fundamentalists most hawkish 
and the unbelievers least so.
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Table VIII - 10 














Complete 7 17% 15% 5% 16%
Military
Victory 6 12 9 12 12
5 22 23 12 21
4 19 20 12 18
3 15 9 14 15
2 9 21 30 12
1 6 3 16 7
Total* 100 100 101 101
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
p <.01
*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
From the table above, categories were created by ccmbining numbers 
7 and 6 into "hawk," 5,4 and 3 into "ambivalent," and 2 and 1 into "dove." 
The resulting picture was that 29% of the fundamentalists were hawks 
compared with 24% of the modernists and 17% of the unbelievers. And 
while only 15% of the fundamentalists were doves, 24% of the modernists 
and 46% of the unbelievers fell into this grouping. The unbelievers, 
almost half of whom could rightly be called doves, were the only cate­
gory in which the ambivalent group did not constitute the majority of 
the sample.
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Table VIII - 11 
Attitude Toward Indochina War and Religious Belief
Religious Belief CategoryAttitude Toward
Indochina War Fundamentalists Modernists Unbelievers
Hawk 29% 24% 17%
Ambivalent 56 52 37
Dove 15 24 46
Total 100 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43)
p <  .01
Given the fact that fundamentalists from the collegiate silent 
majority were more hawkish and thus less dovish than were modernists 
or unbelievers, what of the hard core group? True to the previously 
established pattern, this category turned out to be the most hawkish 
of all, but only slightly more so than the total fundamentalist group. 
One third favored complete military victory and 13% preferred dovish 
positions. The hard core's counterpart, the issue-oriented group, 
was about one-fifth hawk and one-fourth dove. Interestingly, both 
groups were 54% ambivalent.
When religious belief and war attitude were examined with social 
class held constant, unexpected results emerged. The upper middle 
class fundamentalists, the most "liberal" fundamentalist category on 
most issues, proved to be the most hawkish group with 46% favoring a 
complete military victory and only 8% on the dovish end of the spec­
trum. There was virtually no difference in the attitudes of the
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Table VIII - 12
Attitude Toward Indochina War and Preference 
for Campaign Based on God or Issues
Attitude Toward 
Indochina War
Campaign Based on 




Complete 7 21% 11%
Military










Collapsing the table above;
Table VIII - 13 
Attitude Toward Indochina War and Preference
for Campaign Based on God or Issues
Campaign Based on
Attitude Toward God and the Political and







lower middle and working class fundamentalists; about three in ten 
were hawks and fewer than two in ten were doves.
With respect to the modernists and unbelievers, social class had 
no effect on the proportion of hawks, and there was no significant 
difference in the hawkishness of these two groups. The working class 
unbelievers had the lowest hawk percentage with 16%, while the work­
ing class modernists had the highest with 19%. Dove attitudes, how­
ever, were another matter and social class had some effect in this 
area. The most dovish group was the upper middle class unbelievers 
with two-thirds favoring immediate withdrawal, while the working 
class unbelievers had six out of ten in this same category. Lower 
middle class modernists were 46% dovish and lower middle class un­
believers 28%. The working class modernists, like working class 
fundamentalists, were only 14% dovish but had two-thirds in the 
ambivalent category.
Summarizing this chapter we find that a definite relationship 
between religious and political liberalism exists among the Okla­
homa collegiate silent majority in the area of welfarism. This is 
contrary to Lenski's findings in a Detroit sample, but in accord 
with Balswick's data on clergymen.
This religious belief-welfarism belief relationship was found 
to exist only on the question of theoretical welfarism, the instrument 
for measurement being Free and Cantril's ideological Spectrum. The 
results of using Free and Cantril's Operational Spectrum to measure 
attitudes about welfarism in practice produced no significant differ­
ences among religious belief categories or, for that matter, among
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social classes. The Oklahoma college students, like Free and 
Cantril's 1964 national sample, were overwhelmingly liberals (73%) 
and middle of the readers (23%) in practice.
Table VIII - 14
Attitude Toward Indochina War as a Function 











Ambivalent 46 57 56
Dove 8 16 14
Total 100 100 100




Ambivalent 0 36 67
Dove 0 46 14
Total 100 100 100




Ambivalent 17 55 26
Dove 67 28 58
Total* 101 100 100
(N) (6) (18) (19)
*Percentages may not add1 to 100 due •bo rounding.
Testing the level of political information of the sample found
the students split into three groups of similar size. About one-third
were informed, slightly more than one-third were moderately informed, 
and slightly less than a third were uninformed. The best informed 
were the unbelievers; the least informed were the fundamentalists. 
Additionally, it was found that those respondents who were lower in
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political information were less likely to have favorable attitudes 
toward civil liberties and integration.
Exploring attitudes toward the war in Indochina found the 
majority of students tending to be on the hawkish side. The funda­
mentalists had the largest proportion of hawk respondents and the 
smallest proportion of doves. The unbelievers were the exact oppo­
site with the modernists occupying a position in between, though 
closer to the fundamentalist group in attitudes than to the un­
believers. Thus, it might be surmised that a relationship exists 
between religious fundamentalism and a tendency to support American 
military actions, no matter what those actions might be.
CHAPTER IX 
COMPARISON OF THE THREE COLLEGES
The three colleges where sampling was done are located in the 
Greater Oklahoma City Area which is in Central Oklahoma and has a 
population of about 650,000. The size of each school and general 
social background of the students have been previously discussed (see 
Chapter One). What has not been mentioned is that these schools are 
reputed to draw the great majority of their students from the middle 
third of graduating highschool classes. (Those in the upper third 
who attend college within the state generally go to the University 
of Oklahcana or Oklahoma State University.) It is important to remem­
ber that two of the three schools are affiliated with fundamentalist 
churches. With these facts in mind, we now turn to a comparison of 
the student populations of each of the colleges as revealed by the 
samples.
Using Hollingshead's "Two Factor Analysis of Social Position" 
(which utilizes the variables of education and occupation in deter­
mining a respondent's class), it was found that the Central State sam­
ple was 6% upper middle class, Bethany Nazarene 4%, and Oklahoma Chris­
tian 3%, The Central and Oklahoma Christian samples had about the 
same percentage of lower middle class respondents (42% and 40%) and a
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comparable portion of working class respondents (52% and 57%). Beth­
any Nazarene, however, had a significantly larger segment of working 
class students with seven out of ten falling into that category.
Table IX - 1 












Upper Middle 4% 6% 3% 5%
Lower Middle 27 42 40 38
Working 69 52 57 57
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (110) (216) (118) (444)
Religious Belief
Given the affiliations of two of the colleges with fundamentalist 
churches, it was expected that they would show a high percentage of 
fundamentalist respondents. This was indeed the case. Students in the 
Oklahoma Chirstian College sample were 100% fundamentalists, while 
those in the Bethany Nazarene sample were 97% fundamentalists and 3% 
unbelievers. The Central State sample was definitely more hetero­
geneous in composition. Although two-thirds of the respondents from 
that school fell into the fundamentalist grouping, sixteen percent 
were modernists and 18% were unbelievers. This finding represents 
a rather high proportion of fundamentalists for a college class.
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especially in light of some other limited but suggestive findings 
from other Oklahoma colleges and universities. At the University 
of Oklahoma one American Government class of 53 was found to have 
about 50% who rejected the idea of a personal God. Another survey 
at a private college in Oklahcma found a low percentage of funda­
mentalists and about one-fourth who considered themselves unbelievers. 
The explanation for this high proportion of fundamentalists at a sec­
ular college is probably the fact that better than nine in ten attend­
ing Central State are of lower middle or working class backgrounds.
It is well established that persons from these classes are consider­
ably more likely to have a fundamentalist religious outlook.
Table IX - 2












Fundamentalist 97% 66% 100% 82%
Modernist 0 16 0 8
Unbeliever 3 18 0 10
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (110) (216) (118) (444)
It is not at all surprising that church affiliated colleges would have 
a larger percentage of fundamentalists than a secular college. With 
this in mind, and remembering the finding that fundamentalists are 
less favorable toward civil liberties, we turn to that subject.
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Civil Liberties
Some orthodox ministers have maintained that all freedom comes 
from God and that the church is the bastion and defender of liberty.
If such claims had any validity it would seem plausible to expect 
students who attend church-affiliated colleges —  especially those 
colleges affiliated with churches whose ministers make such claims —  
to be in the forefront of those who strongly support individual rights 
as enumerated in the United States Constitution. Historically, "true 
believers" of all varieties have supported repression. It is of in­
terest to examine the attitudes of modern day fundamentalists in this 
regard.
Today in America students at fundamentalist church colleges are 
not generally noted for their libertarian outlook, and those in the 
current study are no exception when comparison is made with respondents 
from the secular college. Just over half of the students from the 
church-affiliated colleges had favorable attitudes toward civil-liber- 
ties, but better than four in five of the Central State students were 
in this category. Conversely, while seventeen and nineteen percent of 
the Oklahoma Christian and Bethany Nazarene respondents, respectively, 
had unfavorable attitudes, only 2% of the Central State sample had 
such ideas about civil liberties.
These findings are consistent with what has been previously men­
tioned in this study, and were expected. Some rather unexpected find­
ings occurred on the subject of racial attitudes, which is the next 
topic.
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Table IX - 3 












Favorable 55% 82% 53%
Ambivalent 26 16 30
Unfavorable 19 2 17
Total 100 100 100
(N) (110) (216) (118)
p <.01
Racial Attitudes
One might well expect the two church-related colleges to evidence 
similar racial attitudes. But they did not. One of them was not 
significantly different from the secular college. About two-thirds 
of the Central State and Oklahoma Christian respondents held inte- 
grationist views, while one-half of the Bethany Nazarene students were 
integrationists. As for segregationist attitudes, there was not a 
great deal of difference among the three schools but Central State had 
the smallest proportion in this category with 15%. Bethany Nazarene 
was 23% segregationist and Oklahoma Christian 21%.
A possible explanation for the high proportion of integrationists 
at Oklahoma Christian College has been suggested in Chapter Six. The 
school is not large and there is a feeling of belonging. There have
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been a number of black athletes at the school, the most prominent of 
which was the aforementioned outstanding decathlon man, Jeff Bennet, 
who won national renown for the school. There are reports that a 
pro-integration attitude is pushed at the school, and the data 
seem to support this. These factors probably contribute to the 
reason that a relatively high percentage of Oklahoma Christian College 
students fell into the integrationist category. Such attitudes, how­
ever, are evidently not related to a lack of authoritarianism as we 
shall note in the next section.
Table IX - 4 










Integrationist 50% 64% 65%
Ambivalent 27 21 14
Segregationist 23 15 21
Total 100 100 100
(N) (110) (216) (118)
p <  .05
Authoritarianism
The "liberal" racial attitudes of the students at Oklahoma Chris­
tian College apparently have not carried over into other areas. That 
authoritarian attitudes are prevalent among the religiously orthodox or 
fundamentalist has been discussed in Chapter Seven. Thus, it was
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expected that the church-affiliated-college students would be validated 
as more authoritarian than those from the state college.
Table IX - 5 










Low 22% 47% 19%
Ambivalent 22 32 24
High 46 21 58
Total* 100 100 101
(N) (110) (216) (118)
p <  .01
*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Oklahoma Christian College was the most authoritarian of the 
three schools with nearly six in ten falling into the high authoritar­
ian grouping. Bethany Nazarene had 46% and Central State 21% in the 
high category. While about one in five of the Bethany Nazarene and 
Oklahoma Christian students were low authoritarians, almost one-half 
of the Central State respondents tested low. These results are 
further evidence that religious fundamentalism and the authoritarian 
personality are positively related.
Attitude Toward Domestic Communism 
As might be expected the importance of combatting domestic Com­
munism was more likely to be foremost in the minds of students attend­
ing the church-affiliated colleges. In light of what has been shown
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Table IX - 6
Attitude Toward Domestic Communism 
and the Three Colleges.
Combatting Communism
College
is the most serious
domestic task facing Bethany Central Oklahoma
our country today. Nazarene State Christian
Strongly disagree 16% 20% 11%
Disagree 27 42 32
Not sure 6 9 11
Agree 26 19 25
Strongly agree 25 10 21
Total 100 100 100
(N) (110) (216) (118)
p<.01




Attitude Toward Domestic Communism
and the Three Colleges
Combatting Communism
College
is the most serious
task facing our Bethany Central Oklahoma
country today. Nazarene State Christian
Disagree 43% 62% 43%
Not sure 6 9 11
Agree 51 29 46
Total 100 100 100
(N) (110) (216) (118)
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about the relationship of authoritarianism, anti-civil-libertarian 
views, and the like to fundamentalism, it is only natural to suppose 
that a substantial number of students at the church colleges would 
view domestic Communism as a great threat and thus among their top 
priorities. The secular college students, being less religiously 
orthodox, would appear more likely to feel either that home-grown 
Reds were not a particularly great threat or that the F.B.I. could 
handle the job without the aid of the average citizen.
The statement by which attitudes toward Communism in America 
were tested was: "Combatting Communism is the most serious domestic
task facing our countiry today. "
As for the responses, one Bethany Nazarene in four and better 
than one Oklahoma Christian student in five strongly agreed with 
this statement. Only one in ten of the Central State students did 
so. In the total "Agree" category (Agree and Strongly agree taken 
together) Bethany Nazarene had half, Oklahoma Christian 46% and Central 
State 29%. In the disagree category each of the two church colleges 
had 43%, while Central State had 62%. Clearly the secular students 
students were less concerned with the "menace" of American Communism 
than were the church college students.
Level of Political Information 
In Chapter Eight it was noted that religious fundamentalists 
scored lower on political information than did modernists or un­
believers. It was also noted that those who were lower in political 
information were more likely to have unfavorable attitudes toward 
civil liberties and more likely to hold views which might be termed
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racist. Given this data it might be surmised that the colleges which 
were more fundamentalist and less favorable toward civil liberties 
would also be lowest on political information.
Since the Central State sample was the least fundamentalist, 
most civil libertarian, a little more favorable toward integration 
than Oklahoma Christian and considerably more so than Bethany Naza­
rene, students at this school might have been expected to have the 
highest level of political information. This, however, was not the 
case. Central State had the lowest proportion in the informed group 
with just over one-fourth and the highest percentage in the uninformed 
category with 36%. There was only a small difference among the schools 
with respect to the moderately informed category with Central State 
having a slightly higher percentage than Bethany Nazarene, 37% to 32%, 
and a slightly lower one than Oklahoma Christian (40%).
We can only speculate as to the reason for these unexpected re­
sults. One factor may be that Central State is a large school with 
many students who hold full-time jobs and more who work part time. 
Three-quarters of the students commute and there is little feeling of 
comaraderie and a comparative lack of on-campus bull sessions about 
national and world affairs. It should also be remembered that the 
modernists and unbelievers in this study, 96% of whom were from 
Central State, were significantly better informed than the fundamen­
talists (see Chapter Eight). This leads to the conclusion that those 
fundamentalists who attended Bethany Nazarene College and Oklahoma 
Christian College in the fall of 1970 were better informed than those 
fundamentalists who attended Central State University during that 
same semester. Therefore, it might be surmised that the modernists
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and unbelievers at Central State are more likely than the fundamental­
ists to seek information on their own.
Summarizing this chapter we find that the students attending 
Central State University were much less fundamentalist in religion, ■ 
slightly higher in social class and considerably more favorable toward 
civil liberties than those attending the two church affiliated colleges. 
The secular college students were also notably less authoritarian and 
less concerned with the threat of domestic Communism.
Though more favorably disposed toward integration than Bethany 
Nazarene students, the Central State respondents were not significant­
ly more so than those from Oklahoma Christian College.
A quite unexpected finding was that the students at the church- 
affiliated colleges were better informed politically than those at 
Central State. This is difficult to explain, but is possibly related 
to the nature of the schools. The church colleges have small, close- 
knit student bodies and the majority of the students live on or very 
near the campus. This facilitates informal discussion of political 
affairs. Central State has a large heterogeneous student body with 
only about 20% living on campus. This makes informal discussion more 
difficult.
CHAPTER X 
PARTY, CANDIDATE, AND IDEOLOGY
The collegiate silent majority will be eligible to vote in the 
presidential election of 1972. Who will the Oklahoma lower middle and 
working class collegians support in the forthcoming election? What 
party do most currently favor? What are the ideologies of these 
young people? Does religious belief effect party and candidate pre­
ference? This chapter is an attempt to answer these questions and 
analyze the answers.
In responding to questions on party identification a plurality 
of the students chose the Republicans. Four in ten preferred the GOP, 
while three in ten claimed to be Democrats. Two in ten said they were 
Independents, 5% preferred the American Party (George Wallace), and 4% 
chose "Other."
Religious belief did not have a powerful effect on party choice. 
Still, one could conclude that fundamentalists tended to be Republi­
cans, modernists and unbelievers leaned toward being Democrats and 
were as likely to be Independents as to be Republicans.
Religious belief did, however, have an effect on the collegiate 
silent majority's 1968 presidential preferences. All three religious 
belief categories preferred Nixon, but the fundamentalists and modern­
ists favored him considerably more strongly than did the unbelievers.
126
127
Better than three-quarters of the former groups wanted Richard Nixon 
to win the election, while slightly over half of the latter group had 
preferred that outcome. Strangely, the unbelievers had the highest 
percentage for George Wallace, with 14%, followed by the fundamental­
ists with 11%. Only 3% of the modernists were for Wallace. Three in 
ten of the unbelievers wanted Hubert Humphrey to become president 
while 18% of the modernists and 13% of the fundamentalists wanted this. 
Considering the entire sample, three-quarters said that they had wanted 
Nixon, with Humphrey preferred by 15% and Wallace by 11%.
Table X - 1 














American 5% 3% 2% 5%
Democrat 28 41 37 30
Republican 45 26 26 41
Independent 19 24 30 20
Other 3 6 5 4
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
Chi square non-significant at .05 level.
Although an overwhelming majority reported that they preferred 
the election of President Nixon in 1968, a great many of these students 
indicated that they would prefer a new face in the White House after 
the 1972 election. Nixon led all candidates in popularity, but only 
received 38% of the vote. Ted Kennedy was second in popularity with
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10%, followed by Edmund Muskie and George Wallace with 5%, and John 
Lindsay with 4%. Eugene McCarthy and "other" received 3%, and Hubert 
Humphrey and George McGovern 1%. The "don't know" group comprised 
30% of the sample. Thus, while Richard Nixon was overwhelmingly
Table X - 2















Humphrey 13% 18% 30% 15%
Nixon 76 79 56 74
Wallace 11 3 14 11
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
P <  .05
preferred over Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace in 1968, his support 
has apparently dwindled among silent majority students. Perhaps a 
Democrat with broad appeal could capture the support of a majority of 
this group.
Religious belief had a significant effect on presidential pre­
ference for 1972. The fundamentalists stuck with Nixon to a greater 
extent than did the other two groups but their support dropped from 
76% to 42%. Unbeliever support for Nixon dropped from 56% to 21%, 
but the most drastic change of view was among the modernists; whereas 
79% stated that they had desired Nixon's election in 1968, only 18%
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wanted him to be re-elected in 1972.
Next to Nixon, Ted Kennedy was the most popular candidate with 
all three groups receiving 9% of the fundamentalist, 24% of the 
modernist and 12% of the unbeliever vote. George Wallace was third 
most popular among fundamentalists with 5%. Edmund Muskie held this 
position among modernists with 9%, and John Lindsay tied with Ted 
Kennedy among unbelievers with 12% followed by Muskie with 9%. 
Fundamentalists had the largest percentage of "don't know" with 
31%; unbelievers the least with 19%.
Table X - 3















Nixon 42% 18% 21% 38%
Kennedy 9 24 12 10
Muskie 4 9 9 5
Wallace 6 3 4 5
Lindsay 3 0 12 4
McCarthy 2 6 7 3
Humphrey 1 6 2 1
McGovern 1 0 5 1
Other 2 6 9 3
Don't know 31 29 19 30
Total* 101 101 100 100
(N) (367) (34) (43) (444)
*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
The preference for the Kennedy name was quite understandable. 
Somewhat puzzling, however, was the lack of popularity of Senator 
Muskie. In October, 1968, a poll taken at Central State found him 
quite acceptable as a vice-presidential candidate even though Humphrey,
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his running mate, was well below both Nixon and Wallace in popularity. 
The answer may lie in the probability that this student population is 
rather poorly informed about potential presidential candidates when 
compared to the populations of large state universities. Many re­
spondents may well have forgotten the name of "that eastern fellow" 
who impressed them two years before.
A comparison of student's 1968 presidential preference with 
their 1972 choices found half of Nixon's supporters sticking with 
him. Two in five of the Wallace supporters still wanted the same 
man, but only one in ten who had wanted Humphrey thought he should 
become president in 1972. The bulk of the remainder of his former 
supporters were almost evenly split between Ted Kennedy with 23%, 
and Edmund Muskie and "don't know" with 21%. The "don't know" 
category also drew about one-third of former Nixon and Wallace 
supporters, while Kennedy received 7% of the former Nixon votes 
and 13% of the former Wallace votes. This last switch was not as 
unusual as might be thought. During the 1968 campaign, a number of 
Central State students who had been for Robert Kennedy switched to 
Wallace after Kennedy's assasination.
The researchers at the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the Uni­
versity of Michigan have long stressed party identification as the 
most important indicator of how an individual will vote. This parti­
cular factor would be less likely to hold true in Oklahoma where many 
registered Democrats are "Democrats in name only." The apparent de­
cline in importance of party identification as a predictor of voting 
behavior, which such commentators as Samuel Lubell^ have stressed is
^Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York:
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taking place on a national scale, was characteristic of Oklahoma 
politics throughout the 1960's. Although registration has always 
been heavily Democrat, the state voted heavily Republican in the 
1960 and 1968 presidential elections. In addition, Oklahoma elected 
Republican governors in 1962 and 1966, and a Republican senator in 
1968. The incumbent Republican governor was defeated by fewer than 
three thousand votes in 1970.
Table X - 4




1968 Presidential Preference 
Nixon Wallace Total
Humphrey 9% 0% 0% 1%
Kennedy 23 7 13 10
Lindsay 5 4 0 4
McCarthy 3 3 4 3
McGovern 3 1 0 1
Muskie 21 2 2 5
Nixon 6 49 6 38
Wallace 0 1 40 5
Other 9 2 0 3
Don't know 21 31 35 30
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (66) (330) (48) (444)
The current student sample seems typical of Oklahoma. Sixty 
percent who identified themselves as Democrats were for Nixon in 1968.
Norton, 1970), pp. 32, 41-42. Lubell stresses that the main factors 
involved in causing the erosion of party loyalty include "...prosperity, 
the changed role of government, and the emergence of a new generation of 
voters. As a result, dramatic voter swings from one election to the 
next have become almost a regular occurrence; but that is very different 
from gaining the sustained voter support which is essential to build and 
hold a stable and lasting party majority." (p. 32).
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One in three was for Humphrey and 7% were for Wallace. Party identi­
fication correlated strongly with support for Nixon among Republicans 
with 92% stating that they had wanted him in 1968. Only 2% of the 
Republicans said they had been for Humphrey and 6% had preferred Wal­
lace. Independents also preferred Nixon with 70%, and 86% of the 
American Party respondents favored Wallace.
Table X - 5














Humphrey 0% 33% 2% 21% 0%
Nixon 15 60 92 70 89
Wallace 85 7 6 10 11
Total* 100 100 100 101 100
(N) (20) (132) (182) (91) (19)
p < .01
*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Viewing the relationship between party and candidate preference 
from another angle we find that two-thirds of those who favored 
Humphrey were Democrats, while half of those for Nixon were Republi­
cans; and 35% of those who wanted Wallace identified with the 
American Party.
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Table X - 6
Proportion of Each 1968 Candidate's 
Vote by Party
1968
Presidential Ameri- Demo- Repub- Inde- Don't know



















* Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Social class had a moderate effect on 1968 presidential preference. 
Forty-one percent of Nixon's vote came from the lower middle class as 
compared with 30% of Humphrey's and 27% of Wallace's vote. Conversely, 
54% of Nixon's support came from the working class, while 65% of 
Humphrey's and 73% of Wallace's came from this class. None of Wallace's 
vote was upper middle class, while Humphrey and Nixon each had 5% of 
their total from this class.
Table X - 7


























Since the total middle class tested as more favorable toward 
civil liberties than did the working class and since a larger por­
tion of Nixon's vote came from the middle class, those who preferred 
Nixon would seem likely to be more civil libertarian than those who 
favored Humphrey or Wallace. This, however, was not the case. 
Humphrey supporters were notably more civil libertarian than Nixon 
supporters who in turn had more favorable attitudes in this area 
than the Wallace supporters. While half the Wallace group and two- 
thirds of the Nixon group fell into the civil-libertarian category, 
better than four out of five Humphrey people were in this grouping 
and none were in the unfavorable category. Comparatively, 10% of 
the Nixon group and one-fourth of the Wallace supporters had un­
favorable attitudes.
Table X - 8
1968 Presidential Preference and Civil Liberties










Humphrey 83% 17% 0% 100% (66)
Nixon 67 23 10 100 (330)
Wallace 50 25 25 100 (48)
This same pattern also held true with respect to racial attitudes. 
Better than four-fifths of the Humphrey preference group were integra­
tionists, while 60% of the Nixon supporters and just over one-third of 
the Wallace group fell into this category. Conversely, only about one
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Humphrey supporter in twenty was a segregationist, compared with one 
Nixon supporter in five and better than two in five of those who 
favored Wallace.
Table X - 9












Humphrey 83% 11% 6% 100% (66)
Nixon 60 22 18 100 (330)
Wallace 35 23 42 100 (48)
Note that the Wallace supporters were the only group in which 
segregationists outnumbered integrationists. Among those preferring 
Humphrey and Nixon integrationists far outnumbered others, interest­
ingly, the percentage of segregationists among Wallace supporters was 
about the same as that in a national sample in 1968. Converse found 
that 40% of those preferring Wallace and 10% of those preferring either 
Humphrey or Nixon were segregationists.^
The patterns noted regarding Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace support­
ers views on civil liberties and racial attitudes also held true in the 
area of authoritarianism. Humphrey supporters were the least authori­
tarian by a considerable margin, while those favoring Wallace were the 
most authoritarian by an even larger margin. Better than six Humphrey
Philip Converse et al, "Continuity and Change in American 
Politics; Parties and issues in the 1968 Election," American Political 
Science Review, 63 (December, 1969), p. 1097.
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people in ten were low authoritarians, while fewer than two in ten 
were high. Less than one-third of the Nixon people scored low, while 
better than a third scored high. A very strongly authoritarian trend 
emerged among Wallace supporters with only one in ten scoring low, 
while almost eight in ten were high in authoritarianism.
Table X - 10
1968 Presidential Preference and Authoritarianism
1968
Presidential
Preference Low Ambivalent High Total (N)
Humphrey 62% 21% 17% 100% (66)
Nixon 32 32 36 100 (330)
Wallace 10 13 77 100 (48)
These results strongly suggest what George Wallace's detractors 
have always claimed and what he has always denied: a significant per­
centage of his supporters are racists who hold anti-civil-libertarian 
attitudes and are highly authoritarian. (Recall that the last concept 
includes rigidity in thinking, adherence to conventional values, emd 
anti-democratic attitudes.) Since this holds true for the Wallacites 
among the collegiate silent majority, it must almost certainly be 
characteristic also of supporters of Wallace who have never attended 
college. Lipset and Raab have indicated that Wallace's greatest sup­
port occurred "among the less educated rural, small town, and working 
class population."^ These are precisely the elements in American
3Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason,
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society which tend to be more anti-libertarian, racist, and authori­
tarian.
Fathers and Sons and Daughters 
Among students of political socialization there is much agree­
ment that in the great majority of cases the offspring adhere to the 
same political party as their parents.* This assertion was reinforced 
by the Oklahoma sample as eight in ten Democrats and two-thirds of the 
Republicans indicated that the party preference of their father was 
the same as their own. Only 30% of the American Party respondents
Table X - 11 











Inde- Other or 
pendent Don't know Total* (N)
American 30% 35% 35% 0% 0% 100% (20)
Democrat 2 79 8 1 11 101 (132)
Republican 1 17 66 1 16 101 (182)
Independent 2 30 29 21 . 19 101 (91)
Other or
Don't know 0 47 21 0 32 100 (19)
p <.01
*Totals may not add to 100 due to rounding.
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 361. Chapters 9 and 10 in this 
book contain an outstanding analysis of the Wallace phenomenon.
*Hugh Bone and Austin Raney, Politics' and Voters, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 32-33; William Flanigan, Political Behavior of 
the American Electorate (Boston; Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 54-55; 
Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York, London and Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 23-29; Lubell, op. cit., p. 212.
138
made this claim; but of course the party is of quite recent origin.
The fact that nearly a third of the collegiate offspring paralleled 
their parent's preference for this new party is surely not without 
significance. The majority of American Party students' fathers were 
evenly split between Democrat and Republican with 35% in each party.
The majority of students, then, preferred the same party as their 
fathers, and a similar relationship held true for their 1968 presiden­
tial preferences. Better than half favored the same candidate as their 
fathers. Those preferring Nixon were most like their fathers with 
three-quarters being in agreement about the Republican president.
Those who preferred Wallace were 58% in agreement with their fathers, 
while those favoring Humphrey were 52% in agreement. One-third of the 
Wallacites' fathers wanted Nixon, as did one-fifth of the Humphreyites' 
fathers. Interestingly, 15% of the Humphrey students' fathers prefer­
red Wallace.
Table X - 12
1968 Presidential Preferences of Students and Their Fathers
Father's 1968 Presidential Preference
Student's 1968
Presidential
Preference Humphrey Nixon Wallace
Don't
know Total* (N)
Humphrey 53% 21% 15% 12% 100% (66)
Nixon 8 74 11 7 100 (330)
Wallace 6 33 58 2 99 (48)
Total 14 62 17 7 100 (444)
p < .01
♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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This table illustrates the fact that of the three 1968 candida­
tes Hubert Humphrey was by a small margin the least popular among 
respondents' fathers, with Richard Nixon the most popular by an over­
whelming margin. Keeping in mind the students' 1972 choices, we may 
speculate that many fathers have also changed their minds about the 
advisability of keeping Mr. Nixon in the White House for another four 
years.
The Ideology Factor 
Political behavior specialists at the University of Michigan's 
Survey Research Center have found that no more than 12% of the 
American public think in ideological terms.^ Thinking in ideological 
terms and being able to identify a given candidate or policy in such 
terms are, however, entirely different matters. Free and Cantril 
found that 90% of a 1964 national sample were willing to identify 
themselves in terms ranging from very liberal to very conservative. 
Another finding of this same study was that 91% were willing to clas­
sify Lyndon Johnson and 73% Barry Goldwater, and the majority perform­
ed this task with scane accuracy. Forty-seven percent called Johnson 
liberal and 29% believed his position to be middle of the road. Gold­
water was classified conservative by 50% and middle of the road by 16%. 
It is interesting to note that 11% saw Goldwater as a liberal and 15% 
saw Johnson as a conservative.®
5Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter (New York : John Wiley 
and Sons, 1960) , pp. 228-229.
^Free and Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans,
Chapter 4.
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Thus it may be stated that while most Americans do not generally
think in ideological terms, they are able to give some meaning to
these terms if they are suggested in specific questions. In this
regard william Flanigan has stated:
As with other political ideas in the minds of Americans 
political ideologies are vague, superficial labels 
applied rather indifferently in their environment.
On the other hand when Americans are asked to 
identify themselves as liberals or conservatives, 
they are able to do so. The categories have sane 
meaning for most Americans; the categories simply are 
not of overriding importance.?
Ideological self identification was obtained by asking the re­
spondent the following;
Do you consider yourself to be:
1. Conservative






As indicated in Chapter Five, the students were 21% liberal, 38% middle 
of the road and 26% conservative. Twelve percent stated that they were 
non-political and 1% chose Radical Right, Radical Left and Other, re­
spectively. The fact has also been mentioned that self identification 
did not have a strong relationship with the respondents' positions on 
either the Ideological or Operational Spectrum. The two most consistent
?Flanigan, op. cit., p. 87.
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groups were the Operational (practical) conservatives, just over half 
of whom identified themselves as conservatives, and the ideological 
(theoretical) liberals, 47% of whom called themselves liberals.
Although a broad range of thought exists in the two major par­
ties, on the average the Republican is more conservative and the Demo­
crat more liberal. The collegiate silent majority showed some under­
standing of this link between parties and ideological labels as 47% of 
those who called themselves liberals identified with the Democrat 
Party and 60% of the self identified conservatives preferred the Repub­
licans. Twenty-one percent of the liberals and 11% of the conservatives
Table X - 13








Liberal 47% 17% 14%
Middle of the Road 28 44 36
Conservative 10 24 34
Radical Right 4 0 1
Radical Left 2 1 1
Other 2 0 2
Non-political 6 14 13
Total* 99 100 101
(N) (81) (163) (200)
p<.01
*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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called themselves independents.
George Wallace's American party presents a special case. Some 
commentators have dubbed it "ultraconservative." Yet this tag is a 
misnomer, since Wallace himself has not been an economic conservative
Table X - 14
Operational (Practical) Spectrum and Self Identification
Self
Identification Liberal
Operational Spectrum Position 
Middle of
the Road Conservative
Liberal 25% 8% 21%
Middle of the Road 37 43 16
Conservative 23 32 53
Radical Right 1 1 0
Radical Left 1 0 5
Other 1 1 0
Non-political 12 15 5
Total 100 100 100
P<.05
and many of his speeches have had overtones of populism. On the other 
hand, his movement has been a rallying point for right extremists of 
all varieties. The 1968 Wallace campaign was in the hands of John 
Birchers in over twenty states, while Ku Kluxers, Christian National­
ist Crusaders and members of the Citizens Councils (often referred to 
as White Citizens Councils) were prominent among the leaders in other
Ostates.
8For documentation write to the Institute for American Democracy,
Table X - 15
Ideological Self Identification and Party Preference
Ideological
Self





No Response Total (N)
Conservative 6% 20% 60% 11% 3% 100% (116)
Middle of the Road 3 29 42 20 6 100 • (167)
Liberal 3 47 27 21 2 100 (92)
Radical Right 25 0 25 50 0 100 (4)
Radical Left 20 0 20 60 0 100 (5)
Other and 




Table X - 16










Radical Other and 
Left Non-political Total* (N)
American 34% 25% 15% 5% 5% 15% 100% (20)
Democrat 18 37 32 0 0 13 100 (132)
Republican 38 38 14 1 1 9 101 (182)
Independent 14 37 21 2 3 22 99 (91)
Other and 
no response 16 53 10 0 0 21 100 (19)
p <  .01
^Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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In addition to the organized extremists of the right, the prin­
cipal sources of Wallace's support according to Lipset amd Raab were 
farmers and segments of a disgruntled industrial working class —  
among the main elements mentioned by Victor Ferkiss as having ccan- 
prised what he called the populist base of American fascism.^ Thus, 
it seems incorrect to refer to the Wallace movement as conservative; 
reactionary perhaps, but not conservative.
Those students who identified with Wallace's American party saw 
themselves as 34% conservative, 25% middle of the road, 15% liberal 
and 15% other or non-political. Viewing this ideology-party relation­
ship in another way, only 6% of those who called themselves conserva­
tives preferred the American party.
Candidate preference and ideological identification were defin­
itely related among the collegiate silent majority. Almost four in 
ten of those who preferred Humphrey in 1968 said they were liberals 
and one-third said they were middle of the readers, while only 13% 
claimed to be conservative. Conversely, three in ten Nixon supporters 
chose the conservative label and four in ten the- middle of the road 
label, with only 18% preferring to be known as liberals. Three in 
ten Wallace supporters claimed the conservative position, one in four 
the middle of the road, and fewer than two in ten the liberal. One 
Wallacite in five claimed to be in the other or non-political category.
1330 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, B.C., 20005. See also 
Lipset and Raab, op. cit., pp. 351-357.
^Lipset and Raab, 0£. cit., pp. 360-361, 379-383; Victor 
Ferkiss, "Populist influences on American Fascism," Western Political 
Quarterly, 10 (June, 1957).
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Consideration of each ideological self identification category 
separately revealed that as a 1968 candidate Nixon had majorities 
in all the larger categories (Radical Right and Left excluded). His 
smallest majority was among liberals (63%), while among middle of 
the readers and conservatives he had the support of four out of five. 
Humphrey did best among the liberals with 27%. Wallace gained his 
greatest proportion among the "other and non-political" group with 21%.
Table X - 17









Conservative 13% 29% 31%
Middle of the road 33 40 25
Liberal 38 18 19
Radical Right 0 1 2
Radical Left 3 1 2
Other and 
non-political 13 12 21
Total* 100 101 100
(N) (66) (330) (48)
♦Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Silent majority students of different ideologies had divergent 
ideas as to which man should become president in 1972. The conserva­
tives gave Nixon a bare majority with 51%, and the middle of the readers 
gave him a significant plurality with 41%. The liberals, however, gave
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Table X - 18
Ideological Identification and 1968 Presidential Preference
Ideological
Identification Humphrey Nixon Wallace Total (N).
Conservative 7% 80% 13% 100% (116)
Middle of the road 13 80 7 100 (167)
Liberal 27 63 10 100 (92)
Other and 
non-political 15 68 17 100 (60)
"don't know" 28%, Nixon 22% and Kennedy 17%, Muskie 9%, McCarthy 8%, 
and Lindsay 7%. "Don't know" ran second among self-styled conserva­
tives with 27% and also among middle of the readers with 29%. But 
the highest percentage of "don't knows" occurred among the "other and 
non-political" group with 43% giving that answer. Nixon had 30% 
among this group and Wallace had 12% —  his highest.
Summarizing the data in this chapter we find that Richard Nixon 
was by far the most popular candidate in 1968 with about three quarters 
of the students preferring him. Only 38% stated that they want him 
again in 1972, but the rest of the respondents divided their preferen­
ces among several candidates, or were not sure who they wanted.
Religious belief had relatively little effect on party preference 
with a slight fundamentalist trend toward Republicanism. With respect 
to candidate preference, however, unbelievers were considerably less 
likely to choose Nixon. The relationship between party identification 
and 1968 candidate preference held strong with Republicans as 92%
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stated they had preferred Nixon. This relationship was quite weak 
among Democrats, however, as only one third affirmed that they had 
desired the election of Hubert Humphrey. (Of those who did support 
Humphrey, two-thirds were Democrats and 29% were Independents.)
Social class affected candidate choice with Nixon supporters 
tending to be higher in the strata than Humphreyites who, in turn, 
were higher than the Wallace followers. This is consistent with a 
statement by Lipset and Raab that "In general, the better educated, 
the more well to do, and those in middle class occupations were less 
likely to vote for Wallace than voters in the lower echelons.
Supporters of Humphrey were more civil libertarian, more pro­
integration and less authoritarian than Nixon supporters, who in 
turn were more civil libertarian, more pro-integration and less author­
itarian then Wallace supporters. This last group had a high percen­
tage of segregationists and a very high percentage of authoritarians. 
Thus, a definite relationship existed between the foregoing attitudes 
and candidate preference.
The respondents' ideological positions affected both party euid 
candidate choices, as did the preferences of the respondents' fathers-
^®Lipset and Raab, op. cit. p. 387.
CHAPTER XI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined the political attitudes and the under­
lying factors influencing those attitudes in a sample of college 
students predominantly from lower middle and working class backgrounds. 
This group has been designated the "collegiate silent majority," since 
their origins are families of the type often referred to by President 
Richard Nixon in speeches as the "forgotten Americans," "middle Ameri­
cans" or "silent majority." Such citizens are not elites or opinion 
leaders; they are neither rich nor poor, and they seldom voice their 
desires in letters to elected officials or by means of demonstrations. 
Those of this group who possess a consciousness of kind seem to view 
themselves as patriots who pay their taxes and keep their mouths shut. 
Some commentators have indicated, however, that the silent majority 
is not silent and certainly not forgotten, especially during election 
years.
The college attending offspring of the silent majority were con­
sidered an important segment of society for study due to several 
reasons. For one, they would be among the more articulate members of 
that group. For another, their opinions might be quite significant in 
the near future as they move into the political, econcanic and social 
systems as college educated representatives of the silent majority.
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In addition, there is intrinsic value in exploring interrelationships 
among sets of attitudes that occur within such groups. Of particular 
interest in this regard is the relationship between political atti­
tudes and social class and religious belief.
Data frran previous studies suggested that the current investi­
gation would find those lower in social class to be less civil liber­
tarian, more favorable toward segregation, more authoritarian, more 
concerned with domestic Communism, and more liberal on the question of 
welfarism. In the areas of civil liberties, authoritarianism and 
disquietude about Conununism in America, the present study is support­
ive of previous investigations. Working class respondents were in­
deed less favorable toward civil liberties than those in the lower 
middle class who, in turn held less favorable attitudes than the upper 
middle class respondents. Class differences were equally noticeable 
in regard to a concern with domestic Communism, with the working class 
students exhibiting the greatest concern. The most notable difference 
in attitudes, however, was evident in the area of authoritarianism 
with the previously established pattern obtaining: working class most 
authoritarian, upper middle class least so.
On questions of race and welfarism, however, the established 
pattern of this investigation broke down. In direct contradiction to 
previous studies, social class had no significant effect on racial 
attitudes among the students in this sample. The same was true of 
attitudes toward welfarism. The utilization of Free and Cantril's 
Ideological Spectrum and Operational Spectrum to gauge beliefs about 
welfarism in both theory and practice revealed no significant differ­
ences among the three social classes. Further, in direct opposition
151
to the idea that the working class is more liberal on economic matters, 
the upper middle class actually had a higher percentage of liberals on 
both Spectrums: 29% to 18% respectively, on the Ideological Spectrum 
and 81% to 74% respectively, on the Operational Spectrum.
These unexpected findings are not readily explained, but it is 
possible to speculate. Perhaps a higher education erodes class dif­
ferences in racial attitudes. Since all respondents in this study 
were in college, the differences in beliefs about integration and 
segregation among the classes had therefore possibly narrowed. Per­
haps a poll of these same people taken three or four years ago, prior 
to their college experience, would have shown significant variations 
by class in racial attitudes. Additionally, personal contact with 
individuals of other races may have a bearing on attitudes. People 
tend to fear or hate that which is unfamiliar, that which they do 
not understand. Two of the sampled colleges were well integrated. No 
questions in the survey explored this matter but perhaps personal 
interracial contact on campus eroded the "native" prejudice of the 
students' Oklahana homes.
Accounting for the difference from previous studies with respect 
to attitudes about welfarism was even more difficult. A possible ex­
planation is that a large percentage of the respondents in the current 
study identified with a higher social class than the one to which they 
objectively belonged. Being college students, many of them were on 
the verge of becoming upwardly mobile. We may surmise that in such 
instances a considerable number have changed their thinking to re­
semble that of the class to which they aspire.
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A correlation between social class and level of political in­
formation was also noted. Upper middle class respondents were the 
best informed; working class respondents were the most poorly in­
formed. This finding was expected and is consistent with previous 
assertions about class and political interest.
While the data reveal that social class is an important under­
lying factor influencing attitudes, there was an even stronger indi­
cation that among the respondents in this particular silent majority 
college sample, religious belief had a greater effect. A religious 
belief-social class interrelationship was evident in the sample with 
the unbelievers being higher in the strata on the average, than the 
fundamentalists or modernists, who were essentially the same.
Previous studies of the association between religious belief 
and attitudes would lead one to expect that fundamentalists (as opposed 
to non-fundamentalists) would tend to be less civil libertarian, more 
likely to be segregationists, more authoritarian, more concerned about 
domestic Communism, and more favorably disposed toward American mili­
tary actions abroad, e.g., the war in Indochina. In the present study 
all of these expectations were fulfilled with the strongest relation­
ships being between fundamentalism and anti-civil-libertarianism, and 
fundamentalism and authoritarianism. The other associations were not 
as strong, but were still statistically significant. Even when social 
class was held constant, the fundamentalists emerged as less favorable 
toward civil liberties and integration and as more authoritarian.
The data indicate, therefore, that among silent majority students, 
the "religious factor" is the most significant underlying determinant
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of political attitudes. That is, if a researcher desired to make 
predictions as to how a respondent stood with regard to views on 
civil liberties, race, authoritarianism. Communism and the war in 
Indochina, he would probably be more accurate in his forecast if 
he knew the respondent's religious belief rather than his social 
class or party identification.
In the areas of welfarism and level of political information 
we could not be sure what to expect. On the former subject previous 
studies had contradictory findings. Thus the question was whether 
or not a relationship exists between religious liberalism and poli­
tical liberalism. Data from the present study answered this question 
in the affirmative. Testing with Free and Cantril's Ideological 
Spectrum found fundamentalists most conservative, modernists more 
liberal and unbelievers most liberal in regard to theoretical 
economic attitudes. No differences among social classes or religious 
belief categories occurred on the Operational Spectrum (practical 
welfarism).
No studies were encountered which had attempted to correlate 
religious belief with level of political information, but the follow­
ing findings in the current study led us to speculate that fundamen­
talists would be less informed than those in the other two belief 
categories :
1. Fundamentalists tested as less favorable toward 
civil liberties. Respondents with less 
political information tested less favorable 
toward civil liberties.
2. Fundamentslists tested as less favorable toward 
integration. Respondents with less political 
information tested less favorable toward integration.
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Given these facts it was logical to expect exactly what the data re­
vealed • fundamentalists had a lower level of political information 
than modernists or unbelievers.
A comparison of the three colleges where sampling was done re­
vealed that students at the secular state institution, Central State 
University, were more favorable toward civil liberties, less authori­
tarian, and less concerned with domestic Communism than those at the 
church-affiliated colleges. On racial attitudes, Oklahoma Christian 
College joined Central State in having fewer racist tendencies than 
Bethany Nazarene. At the same time Oklahoma Christian proved to be 
highest in authoritarianism of the three schools. Since the two 
church colleges were 97% and 100% fundamentalist, respectively, com­
parison became that of two sets of fundamentalists with a group 
(Central State) that was composed of two thirds fundamentalists, 16% 
modernists, and 18% unbelievers. Hence, the differences among the 
three schools in no small degree reflect the differences in religious 
belief prevalent at each institution.
At this point it would seem worthwhile to present a portrait of 
the average fundamentalist, modernist and unbeliever as they emerged 
from the data. The statements characterizing each type highlight 
their contrasts.
The average fundamentalist in this study is lower middle or work­
ing class in origin. He is considerably less favorable toward civil 
liberties, more authoritarian, more concerned with American Commumism, 
and less favorable toward integration than his modernist and unbeliever 
counterparts. He is a theoretical conservative or middle of the roader.
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but a practical liberal on welfarism. He has a low to moderate 
level of political information and tends to be hawkish on the 
subject of Vietnam.
The average modernist is also of lower middle or working class 
origin. He is quite favorable toward civil liberties and integration. 
He is either a low authoritarian or ambivalent on that count, and he 
does not view combatting Communism as a very important task. He is 
a theoretical middle of the roader, but a practical liberal on wel­
farism. He has a moderate level of political information and tends 
to be ambivalent about the war in Indochina.
The average unbeliever is of lower middle or upper middle class 
origin. He holds very favorable attitudes toward civil liberties and 
integration. He is low in authoritarianism and does not view domestic 
Communism as a very great threat. He is a theoretical middle of the 
roader and a practical liberal on welfarism. He has a moderate to high 
level of political information and tends to be a dove with regard to 
the Indochina conflict.
An examination of party and candidate preferences found a plural­
ity choosing the Republicans. A clear majority favored Richard Nixon 
in 1968, and a plurality desired his re-election in 1972. The remain­
der of the choices for 1972 were divided among ten other candidates 
and "don't know." Senator Edward Kennedy was the second most popular 
candidate.
Although Richard Nixon emerged as the choice of three-quarters 
of the sample with regard to the 1968 presidential election, fewer than 
four in ten felt that he should be returned to the White House in 1972.
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It might be surmised that this drop in Nixon's popularity two years 
later was due greatly to the economic situation which obtained in 
October of 1970, when the collegiate silent majority was sampled. 
Perhaps his popularity has dipped even lower with these students as 
it did in the nation during 1971. Certainly the state of the econ­
omy was something less than satisfactory, and these students, it 
will be recalled, were from families of the lower middle and working 
classes.
In the area of party preference, religious belief had little 
effect. Fundamentalists showed a slight tendency to be Republicans, 
while modernists and unbelievers displayed tendencies to be Democrats 
and were as likely to be Independents as Republicans. Two factors 
which did influence party preferences, however, were the respondent's 
father's party preference and the respondent's ideological identifica­
tion as a liberal, conservative, etc. Eight in ten Democrats and two 
in three Republicans gave their father's party preference as their own. 
Additionally, about half of those who called themselves liberals were 
Democrats and three-fifths of those who called themselves conservatives 
were Republicans. This demonstrates at least some feeling for the 
general ideological positions of the two major parties, with the Demo­
crats viewed as the more liberal group; the Republicans as more con­
servative.
Lending credence to the belief that party identification is 
eroding as a predictor of candidate preference is the fact that sixty 
percent of the Democrats stated that they had wanted Nixon to be 
elected president in 1968. Candidate preference was, however, affected
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by social class, religious belief, ideological identification, and 
respondent's father's preference. Nixon received proportionally 
greater support from the lower middle class (41% of his vote), 
fundamentalists, and self proclaimed conservatives. The largest 
proportions of Humphrey's vote by group came from the working class, 
unbelievers, and liberals. Almost three quarters of the 1968 
Wallacites were working class in origin. Better than half of the 
Humphrey and Wallace supporters and three-quarters of the Nixon sup­
porters had the same candidate preferences as their fathers.
Perhaps the most interesting finding with respect to candi­
date preferences was that the students who preferred Hubert Humphrey, 
Richard Nixon or George Wallace in 1968 had very different attitudes 
with respect to civil liberties, racism and authoritarianism. The 
Humphreyites were the most civil libertarian, the most favorable 
toward integration and the least authoritarian, and the margin between 
this group and others was considerable. No Humphreyite held unfavor­
able attitudes toward civil liberties and only 6% favored segregation. 
The Nixonites, though significantly different in attitudes from the 
Humphreyites, were definitely more favorable toward civil liberties 
and integration and less authoritarian than the Wallacites. The latter 
were the only group containing more segregationists than integration- 
ists. In addition, better than three-quarters of the Wallacites were 
high authoritarians. This last suggests that Wallace's followers have 
been looking for a leader of the man-on-horseback variety who will 
take charge and make it possible for them to "escape from freedom," 
with all its responsibilities.
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As a final commentary on this study, two important questions may
be raised :
1. Are Richard Nixon eind Spiro Agnew fitting 
spokesmen for the collegiate silent majority?
2. Do any of the data give the responsible citizen 
cause for concern? That is, are any of the 
results disturbing or worrisome?
The answer to the first question is yes in that both Nixon and 
Agnew use generalizations such as "forgotten Americans," "law and 
order," "coddling of criminals," "effete snobs," etc., which have 
considerable appeal to those who are not politically sophisticated 
and who, therefore, have little or no basis for analysis of such 
glittering generalities. Further, talk of fiscal responsibility and 
putting those on welfare to work appeals to the theoretical econanic 
conservatism of the collegiate silent majority. Continued inflation 
and the concommitant high rate of unemployment, however, have cut 
into the popularity of the Nixon administration. If the situation 
does not change to a noticeable extent during the next year, America's 
urgent economic problems will override such "social issues" as crime 
in the streets. Richard Nixon may then turn out to be a one term 
president.
The answer to the second question is also yes. The data in this 
study give definite support to the view that the strongest underlying 
influence on political attitudes is religious belief. The "religious 
factor" is a greater influence than social class or party identifica­
tion. In light of this, we should recall the differences in attitudes 
between religious fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists. What is
159
disturbing is that from the standpoint of concerned citizens who truly 
believe in a relatively democratic political system and all that such 
a system entails (civil liberties, equal opportunity, etc.), the 
growth of religious fundamentalism may be dysfunctional for American 
democracy. Even if this is not an accurate appraisal, it may be said 
that since fundamentalists appear more likely to hold anti-democratic 
attitudes, they are certainly less likely to contribute to the growth 
and spread of democratic beliefs and practices. Rokeach, Stark and 
other social scientists have viewed such findings about fundamentalists 
as enigmatic and alarming. Here it is hardly possible to begin to 
suggest solutions. Before any solution can be found there must be 
recognition of a problem. Hopefully, this study helps to focus 
attention on the problem.
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APPENDIX
The questionnaire used in this study consists of four sections. 
The first, numbered 1-23, involves general information about respond­
ents and their parents as to age, occupation, education, religious 
preference, political preferences, etc.
The second section, numbered 1-31, involves the concepts of 
authoritarianism, civil liberties, race, welfarism, and religious 
beliefs.
The third section, numbered 1-14, involves statements about 
religious belief, welfarism, demonstrations, and the war in Indochina.
The last section, numbered 1-10, consists of political in­
formation questions which have been asked over the years by various 
polling organizations.
The statements on authoritarianism (1-9) are from The Authori­
tarian Personality by Adorno and his collaborators (1-8) and The Open 
and Closed Mind by Rokeach (9). Statement 10 on combatting Communism 
is from "Student Attitudes Toward Communism," by Schonbar.
The sources of statements on civil liberties (11-20) cire as 
follows. Number 11 is an original. Numbers 12 thru 16 (13 and 15 
slightly modified) are from "Measurement of Radicalism-Conservatism," 
by Comrey and Newmeyer. Statement 17 is a slight modification of a 
question used in a CBS News poll on the Bill of Rights, March 20, 1970. 
Statements 18 and 19 are from "Consensus and Ideology in American 
Politics" by McClosky. Statement 20 is from an undated mimeographed 
sheet distributed by the Citizens Committee for Humane Abortion Laws.
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Statements 21-24 concern racial attitudes. Number 21 is a 
slight modification from Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism by Clock 
and Stark. The other three are modifications of questions used in 
"White Attitudes Towcird the Negro" by Sheatsley.
Statements 25-29 are modifications of Free and Cantril's 
Ideological Spectrum used in The Political Beliefs of Americans.
Statement 30 is from Comrey and Newmeyer's previously men­
tioned study. Thirty-one is an original statement.
Also concerning religion are the first five questions in the 
section following statement 31. Questions 1 thru 4 are modifications 
of ones used by Clock and Stark in Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism. 
Number 5 is from The Religious Factor by Lenski.
Questions 5 through 10 are modifications of Free and Cantril's 
Operational Spectrum used in The Political Beliefs of Americans.
Questions 11 and 12 are originals, while 13 and 14 are from 
"Silent Majorities and the View Nam War" by Converse and Schuman.
STUDENT ATTITUDES QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please fill in the blank or circle the number of the appropriate answer.
1. Age_________  3. Major____________________________




















1. Assembly of God
2. Baptist
3. Catholic
4. Church of Christ
5. Church of God
6. Congregational















9. How often do you attend 
religious services?
1. At least once a week
2. Two or three times a month
3. Occasionally
4. Seldom
5. Not in the last year
10. Father's occupation (If your father is deceased or retired please give 
his former occupation. Also, please be specific.)










6. D o n 't know
12. Please circle the number which represents the last year your father 
completed in school.




















13. Mother's occupation (If your mother is deceased or retired please give 
her former occupation.) _______________________________________________
14. Mother's party preference:
1. American 3. Republican 5. Other_
4. Independent2. Democrat 6, Don't know
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15. Please circle the number which represents the last year your mother 
completed in school.
Grade School 






1 3  5 7
2 4 6 8 or more
16. Which 1968 presidential candidate did you find most acceptable?
1. Hubert Humphrey 2. Richard Nixon 3. George Wallace
17. Whom do you prefer in 1972?
1. Hubert Humphrey 4.
2. Ted Kennedy 5.








18. Which 1968 presidential candidate did your father find most acceptable? 
1. Hubert Humphrey 2. Richard Nixon 3. George Wallace
19. Whom does your father prefer in 1972?
1. Hubert Humphrey 4. Eugene McCarthy
2. Ted Kennedy 5. George McGovern





20. Which 1968 presidential candidate did your mother find most acceptable? 
1. Hubert Humphrey 2. Richard Nixon 3. George Wallace
21. Whom does your mother prefer in 1972?
1. Hubert Humphrey 4. Eugene McCarthy
2. Ted Kennedy 5. George McGovern









22. Do you consider yourself to be: 
1. Conservative











23. Would you say that you belong to the:
1. Upper class
2. Upper middle class




Please choose the answer that comes nearest to expressing your opinion 
about each statement. Place the number of your answer in the blank at
of each statement.
1. SD Strongly disagree
2. D Disagree
3. N Not sure or neutral
4. A Agree
5. SA Strongly agree
For example, if a statement was:
________1. There is more individual freedom in the U.S. than there is in
Russia.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
Most of you would probably strongly agree, therefore you would put a "5" 
in the blank.
_1. The worst danger to real Americanism during the last fifty 
years has come from foreign ideas and agitators.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
__2. America is getting so far from the true American way of life 
that force may be necessary to restore it.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
3. The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are nursery
school stuff compared to some of the goings-on in this country 
today.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important 
virtues children should learn.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_5. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more 
than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly 
whipped, or worse.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_5. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel 
a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_7. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by 
plots hatched in secret places.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
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 8. What our youth need most is strict discipline, rugged deter­
mination, and the will to work and fight for family and country. 
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
 9. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world
there is probably only one which is correct.
1. SD 2. D 3. N. 4. A 5. SA
_10. Combatting Communism in the United States is the most serious 
domestic task facing our country today.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
11. Constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly should 
not apply to American communists.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
12. More restrictions should be imposed to prevent young people from 
having sexual relations before marriage.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_13. Our laws give too much protection to suspected criminals.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_14. If a man is showing a sex movie to friends in his own home, 
the police should stop it.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
15. Every city should ban objectionable books and movies.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
16. The police should hunt down homosexuals and put them in jail.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_17. If police suspect that drugs or guns, or other criminal evidence
is hidden in someone's house, they should be allowed to enter 
the house without first obtaining a search warrant.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_18. A book containing wrong political views should not be published, 
much less be put in our libraries.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_19. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled
to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
20. It should be a woman's right to decide whether or not she should 
have an abortion.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
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_______21. It would probably be better if black and white children
attended separate schools.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______22. I would prefer to live in a segregated neighborhood.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______23. Two persons of different races should not marry.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
 24. I would object if a member of my family brought a person of
another race home to dinner.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______25. The Federal Government is interfering too much in state and
local matters.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______26. The government has gone too far in regulating business and
interfering with the free enterprise system.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______27. Social problems here in this country could be solved more
effectively if the government would only keep its hands off 
and let people in local communities handle their own problems 
in their own ways.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______28. Generally speaking, any able-bodied person who really wants
to work in this country can find a job and earn a living.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______29. We should rely more on individual initiative and ability and
not so much on governmental welfare programs.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______30. All the miracles described in the Bible really happened.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
_______31. Hell, as described in the Bible, actually exists.
1. SD 2. D . 3. N 4. A 5. SA
The following questions are multiple choice. Please pick the answer that 
most nearly expresses your opinion and place the number of that answer in 
the blank to the left of the question.
________ 1. Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing
what you believe about God?
5. I know God really exists and I haven't any doubts about it.
4. While I have my doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.
3. I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at 
other times.
2. I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a 
higher power of some kind.
1. I don't know whether there is a God and i don't believe 
there is any way to find out.
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_2. The Devil actually exists.
1. Definitely not true
2. Probably not true
3. Possible, but doubtful
4. Probably true
5. Completely true
 3. Do you think belief in Jesus Christ as Saviour is......
5. Absolutely necessary for salvation
4. Probably necessary for salvation
3. Would possibly help
2. Probably has little influence
1. Probably had no influence
 4. Do you think being a member of your particular religious
faith is.....
5. Absolutely necessary for salvation
4. Probably necessary for salvation
3. Would possibly help
2. Probably has little influenoe
1. Probably has no influence
_5. In politics would you prefer a candidate who bases his 
campaign on:
1. His belief in God and the American way of life
or
2. A discussion of political and economic problems
_5. Federal aid to education includes grants to help pay teachers' 
salaries. Are you;
1. For this 2. Against this 3. Not sure
 7. "Medicare" for the elderly is financed out of social security.
In general do you feel that you:
1. Approve of this 2. Disapprove of this 3. Not sure
_8. Under the federal housing program the Federal Government is 
making grants to help build low-rent public housing. Do you 
think government spending for this purpose should be:
1. Kept at least at the present level 2. Reduced
3. Ended altogether
 9. Under the urban renewal program, the Federal Government is making
grants to help build run-down sections of our cities. Do you 
think government spending for this purpose should be:
1. Kept at the present level 2. Reduced
3. Ended altogether
_10. The Federal Government has a responsibility to try to reduce
unemployment and to try to do away with poverty in this country.
1. Agree 2. Disagree 3. Not sure
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_11. If a friend of yours informed you that he was going to take 
part in a non-violent demonstration to protest something he 
considered to be wrong, would you:
1. Strongly approve
2. Approve
3. Be unsure or neutral
4. Disapprove
5. Strongly disapprove
12. Please indicate with a check mark the statement or statements 
which are acceptable to you.
 1. Violent demonstrations are acceptable in many situations.
 2. Violent demonstrations are acceptable in some situations.
 3. Non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in most situations.
 4. Non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in some situations.
 5. No demonstrations are acceptable to me; not even non­
violent ones.
13. There is much talk about "hawks" and "doves" in connection with 
Vietnam, and considerable disagreement as to what action the U.S. 
should take in Vietnam. Some people think we should do everything 
necessary to win a complete military victory, no matter what the 
results. Some think we should withdraw completely from Vietnam 
right now, no matter what the results. Other people have opinions 
somewhere between these two extreme positions. On the scale 
below please place an X above the number which you feel indicates 
your opinion regarding Vietnam.
Immediate Withdrawal Complete Military Victory
14. Where would you place President Nixon on this same scale? Please 
indicate by placing an X below.
Immediate Withdrawal Complete Military Victory
The following are information questions.
__________ 1. U Thant is:
1. President of South Vietnam
2. Secretary-General of the United Nations
3. President of Burma
4. President of Cambodia
5. I'm not sure
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_2. NATO;
1. National Alliance Tactical Operation
2. The Russian secret police
3. A new drug similar to LSD
4. The Atlantic Alliance of which the United States is a 
member.
5. I'm not sure
_3. Mao Tse Tung is;
1. Chairman of the Communist Party of China
2. Head of the Chinese government on Taiwan
3. President of South Vietnam
4. President of Cambodia
5. I'm not sure
_4. Filibuster is;
1. A new atomic weapon
2. An illegal method of passing legislation
3. The oldest member of the United States Congress
4. A method by which proposed legislation is "talked to death"
5. I'm not sure





5. I'm not sure
_6. v . I .  Lenin was;
1. A German philosopher
2. A 19th century religious leader
3. Hitler's propaganda minister
4. The dictator of Russia from 1918 1924
5. I'm not sure
_7. The "Stand up for America League" is;
1. A communist-front organization
2. A patriotic, pro-American, action organization
3. A musical group
4. A publishing company
5. I'm not sure
_8. "congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech or the press..."
1. Declaration of Independence
2. Communist Manifesto
3. 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution
4. 1933 Nazi Party Platform
5. I'm not sure
6. The Rights of Man by Thomas Paine
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_9. Do you feel that the Mann Act is an unfair burden on 
organized labor?
_10. Can you name any of the three branches of the national 
government?
1. 
2.
3.
